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ABSTRACT 
 
 China’s “shengnü” – or “leftover women” – are a group of highly-educated, sin-
gle, urban women that the Chinese government has targeted in a scare-mongering media 
campaign intent on pushing these women to give up their careers or education in order to 
marry and produce children for the “betterment” of the state. Since 2007, this group of 
women has faced highly negative articles and images published both by the All China 
Women’s Federation and other news outlets encouraging shengnü to “fix” their problems 
and marry. These highly-educated, unmarried women are seen as violators of traditional 
gender norms and roles, and the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign is an attempt 
to reinforce these gender norms. This thesis project examines changes in Chinese mar-
riage throughout history in an attempt to show the inevitability of highly-educated, single 
women in Chinese society, coupled with an analysis of media articles and images, which 
is contrasted by an analysis of blogs written by the shengnü themselves.  
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FOREWORD 
 
“In 2006, the Chinese magazine Fashion ∙ Cosmopolitan published an issue of 
their magazine with the front cover headline ‘Welcome to the Era of Leftover Women.’ 
Although many people believed that the magazine was [intentionally] exaggerating wom-
en’s anxiety in order to increase sales, it is an undisputed fact that marriage in China is 
thoroughly changing; women in urban areas are getting married later, as [a woman’s] 
educational attainment increases, marriage comes later, and more and more highly edu-
cated women are not getting married at all.”1 
 
The fate of China’s single, highly-educated women was indefinitely sealed in 
2006 when the popular Chinese edition of Cosmopolitan christened the group “leftover” 
from the marriage market. The pejorative “leftover” label, explained by the above quote 
as Cosmopolitan magazine’s scare tactic to increase sales, took roughly a year to circulate 
through the Internet’s various channels until it was chosen by the Chinese government to 
headline a media campaign that held single, highly-educated women as responsible for 
the country’s unmarried men epidemic.  
Prior to the 2007 creation of the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign, some-
one, somewhere in the Chinese government became aware of a terrible problem: even if 
every woman got married, there would still be millions of men unable to find a wife, thus 
threatening the harmony of society. However, not every Chinese woman is willing to get 
married. The number of single women in China continues to grow alongside the number 
of single males, much to the disdain and confusion of the marriage-obsessed society. De-
spite the insurmountable evidence that the Chinese government was to blame for the 
highly-skewed sex ratio imbalance (and thus the estimated 20 million bachelors), the 
                                                 
1 “Zhongguo: Shengnü de kunjing” (China: Leftover women’s predicament), Weizazhi Diary, Douban, last 
modified May 7, 2012, http://site.douban.com/136100/widget/notes/6051842/note/213344331/. 
2 
 
government instead decided to exploit the “leftover women” as a scapegoat to quell 
growing dissatisfaction with population planning.2 Chinese society, which has long been 
viewed as a marriage-centric culture, is unable to comprehend singlehood as a lifestyle. 
As such, the “leftover women” became a terrifying new phenomenon that some viewed 
as a threat to traditional marriage values and gender norms. Thus, the not-so-humble 
roots of Cosmopolitan China’s “leftover” woman morphed into a country-wide move-
ment to both scare and guilt single, highly-educated women into running to the altar, 
eventually “saving” Chinese society.  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 By year 2020, men of marriageable age will outnumber women by 24 million.  
Xue Li, “Why is the Sex Ratio Unbalanced in China? The Roles of the One-Child Policy, Underdeveloped 
Social Insurance, and Parental Expectations” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2011.) 
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INTRODUCTION 
In early 2007, most likely after receiving a distressing report on its population sta-
tistics, China’s State Council issued an edict on strengthening the Population and Family 
Planning Program3 to address “unprecedented population pressures.”4  These pressures 
include a “sex-ratio imbalance5 — which ‘causes a threat to social stability,’ an aging 
population coupled with a sub-replacement fertility rate6, and the ‘low quality’7 of the 
general population, which makes it hard to meet the requirements of fierce competition 
for national strength.”8 In response, the Chinese State Council appointed the All-China 
Women’s Federation (ACWF)9 to help aid the Population and Family Planning Program 
in upgrading population quality.10 In conjunction with the State Council’s edict, the 
ACWF began to post articles encouraging “shengnü (剩女),” or single, highly-educated 
                                                 
3 Cuntong Wang, “History of the Chinese Family Planning Program: 1970–2010,”Contraception 85 (2012): 
563-569, accessed November 15, 2014, doi:10.1016/j.contraception.2011.10.013. 
4 “Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan guanyu quanmian jiaqiang renkou he jihua shengyu gongzuo tong-
chou jiejue renkou wenti de jueding” (The CCP’s State Council’s verdict regarding all-around strengthen-
ing population and planning to solve the population problem), Xinhua News, January 22, 2007, accessed 
November 15, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2007-01/22/content_5637713.htm. 
5 From a study done by Therese Hesketh of the UCL Centre for International Health and Development, the 
Chinese sex ratio imbalance in 2007 was nearly 120 male births to 100 female births, where the normal sex 
ratio at birth (SRB) is 1.07 male(s)/female 
6 Nicholas Eberstadt, 'The Demographic Risks to China’s Long-Term Economic Outlook,' 
Cgd.Swissre.Com, http://cgd.swissre.com/topics/Demographic_risks_to_China.html.  
7 Low quality referring to the portion of the Chinese population that is considered “low education” and has 
a “low standard of life” as discussed in an interview with Leta Hong Fincher;  
Yining Su, ''It Boils Down to the Government's Obsession with Population Quality': Interview with Leta 
Hong Fincher [Part 2],' Shanghaiist, April 19, 2014, accessed December 29, 2014, 
http://shanghaiist.com/2014/04/19/interview-leta-hong-fincher-leftover-women-part-2.php. 
8 Leta Hong Fincher, “China’s ‘Leftover’ Women,” New York Times, October 11, 2012, accessed October 
10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/opinion/global/chinas-leftover-women.html?_r=0. 
9 The ACWF is China’s leading authority for women’s livelihood and wellbeing, first established in 1949 
as a women’s rights organization. 
10 Fincher, “China’s ‘Leftover’ Women.”  
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“leftover women,” to get married quickly and have children.11 The ACWF, and in turn 
the government, believed that the path to “upgrading population quality” and increasing 
marriage rates in the name of social harmony was exclusively through targeting the “left-
over women” at the expense of gender equality. What came to be known as the ACWF’s 
“leftover women phenomenon” campaign coincided with Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 
“Harmonious Society” campaign from the early 2000s, where President Hu encouraged 
the nation to strive towards a more “harmonious” existence, claiming that in order to do 
so, his government would “crack down on various social ills, which are a poisonous tu-
mor in a harmonious society and must be eliminated.”12 The timing of the “leftover 
women phenomenon” campaign suggests that President Hu believed that “leftover wom-
en” were not conducive to a harmonious society, and it was the ACWF’s job to fix that.  
 In August of 2007, months after the ACWF’s first few articles on “leftover wom-
en” were published, the word “shengnü” was officially added to the Chinese Ministry of 
Education’s lexicon. The term “shengnü” originated under the guidance of Cosmopolitan 
China editor, Xu Wei, who in 2006 coined the term to describe women who hold high 
expectations for finding a husband, but remained single.13 Since conception, the term 
“shengnü” has evolved and expanded to its current definition of  
“[a woman who] has already surpassed society’s suitable age for marriage, 
but still not married, generally 27 years or older single women, most of 
whom have high educational background, high salaries and an outstanding 
appearance, but also have numerous shortcomings. Many [of these wom-
en] have high requirements for choosing a spouse, which brings about be-
                                                 
11 Ibid.  
12 Hu Jintao, “Harmonious Society,” China Daily, September 29, 2007, accessed April 17, 2015, 
http://en.people.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html. 
13 Zi Xin Yang, “A Woman's Way,” All China Women's Federation, March 13, 2011, accessed October 11, 
2014, http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/news/newsmakers/12/7689-1.htm. 
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ing unable to find an ideal ending in marriage, so they become older aged 
‘leftover women.’”14 
 
Other definitions state that shengnü are commonly referred to as “3S” or “3 gao 
(高)” ladies; “3S” standing for Single, Seventies (referring to the decade of their birth, the 
1970s) and Stuck (meaning unmarried), while “3 gao,” or 3 “highs,” refers to a highly 
educated, highly paid, high expectations woman. In a different cultural context, these 
characteristics would not necessarily be negative, as many Westerners would celebrate a 
“3S” or “3 gao” lady as an independent woman in control of her life and goals. However, 
since the ACWF picked up the term in 2007 and began publishing semi-controversial ar-
ticles like “Overcoming the Big Four Emotional Blocks: Leftover Women Can Break out 
of Being Single,” “Eight Simple Moves to Escape the Leftover Women Trap,” and “Do 
Leftover Women Really Deserve Our Sympathy?” the redeeming “3S” and “3 gao” 
qualities transformed into flaws. The shengnü term slowly began to assume negative 
characteristics and the women themselves began to appear as perpetrators of traditional 
marriage values and gender norms. 
For several years, the term’s negative connotation fluctuated in severity, but in 
2010, shengnü was viewed definitively as a highly pejorative term after gaining negative 
                                                 
14 Original text from a Baidu dictionary entry: “是指已经过了社会一般所认为的适婚年龄，但是仍然未
结婚的女性，广义上是指 27岁或以上的单身女性，很多拥有高学历、高收入和出众的长相，但也
有很多自身条件较差。多数择偶要求比较高，导致在婚姻上得不到理想归宿，而变成“shengnü”的
大龄女青年.” Link to original text: 
http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=OC2BdUMzzqRrJzUTYkjAVMu0slsxq8CNBwXVedmx1OS5q5xQupJclS
BgA8vugypxXVR3depv0ol2mCBAMwR7Tb8zcloHSY9P8NH8X2fvMpu.  
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attention from China’s popular dating gameshow “Feicheng Wurao (非诚勿扰).”15 On 
the most infamous episode of Feicheng Wurao, one prospective female dater replied “I 
would rather cry in a BMW than smile on a bike,” after being asked by the unemployed 
male contestant if she would be willing to ride on a bicycle as a date.16 This response re-
ceived enormous public backlash. Many older, conservative generations proclaimed that 
the Chinese youth, especially the female portion, were “too materialistic” and “too ob-
sessed with money.” Materialism, a seemingly imported Western ideal, offended and in-
furiated older, more conservative generations. Although the Feicheng Wurao woman’s 
one-liner was more emblematic of urban Chinese youth as a whole (with many younger 
Chinese men and women agreeing that economic background is an important factor in 
deciding whether or not to get married), many seized the opportunity to associate the re-
ply as synonymous with the confusing “leftover women” phenomenon instead. Aided by 
society’s confusion, various articles published and republished over the course of several 
years by the ACWF and other media outlets, and by the opinion of a woman on a 
gameshow, the once-neutral term for unmarried, older women, quickly spiraled into a 
highly-negative stereotype that girls hoped to avoid. 
Combined, these various parts created the “leftover women phenomenon” cam-
paign propagated by the state-controlled media. In the beginning, a series of articles pub-
lished and republished by the ACWF and other media outlets depicted the shengnü in a 
highly negative way, as the aforementioned article headlines demonstrate. These articles 
                                                 
15 非诚勿扰, “If You Are The One,” is a Chinese dating gameshow that began in 2010 where several wom-
en judge a single male contestant on several features, with the end goal of a woman agreeing to go on a 
date with the male contestant. 
16 Original text: “我宁愿坐在宝马车里哭，也不愿意坐在自行车上笑,” “Wo ningyuan zuo zai baomache 
li ku, ye bu yuanyi zuo zai zixingche shang xiao.” 
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served as a foundation for the campaign, the goal of which is to highlight perceived 
weaknesses and flaws of shengnü as a way to “help” them fix their personal problems 
and find a spouse (thus alleviating the marriage woes of millions of unmarried men and 
redirecting highly-educated, successful women to traditional gender norms). Outside of 
the articles, the daily discussion and other non-print materials help solidify the idea that 
shengnü is a societal problem that every citizen – the shengnü themselves – is liable to 
fix. And, when quickly searching on Chinese search engines, there are several sources 
doing just that – offering guides and services in “fixing” the shengnü problem. At the be-
ginning of the campaign in 2007, the ACWF was also a culprit, guilty of publishing lists 
on how to “fix” the shengnü’s inherent flaws. However, the Chinese government has not 
admitted to playing a role in the scare-mongering campaign via the ACWF, and subse-
quently many of the original negative ACWF articles have been retracted or revised in 
order to showcase a more fair depiction of the shengnü (and suppress gender inequality 
arguments). Nevertheless, by the time they were deleted or revised, the original articles 
had already been republished by other media outlets, thus simultaneously perpetuating 
the government’s original “leftover women phenomenon” campaign and freeing the gov-
ernment of blame. The “leftover women phenomenon” campaign was successfully im-
planted within both the Internet and Chinese society.  
Who is the shengnü that the government is exhausting itself over “fixing”? Simp-
ly put, the average shengnü is merely a product of society’s unclear demands. The first 
few generations of shengnü were born in a time of expanding educational, political, eco-
nomic, and social opportunities for women. Availability of advanced educational oppor-
tunities for young women from the 1970s to the present, combined with societal rever-
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ence for education founded in traditional Confucian ideals and older generations’ person-
al experience with schooling, resulted in a large influx of women with MA’s and PhD’s. 
Chinese society encourages women to pursue higher education and careers, yet the pur-
suit of an advanced degree or a high-profile job comes with what the government would 
consider adverse side effects. When weighing the costs of marriage and education, many 
women choose to postpone dating or starting a family in order to pursue personal goals 
and interests, as marriage and child-rearing are considered to be too demanding on top of 
a full-time job. Thus, a typical Chinese woman is faced with a decision between marriage 
and education that is inherently paradoxical. Chinese girls are encouraged to go to school 
in order to become successful in a highly competitive arena. Intelligent Chinese women 
are then pushed to obtain a Master’s or a PhD, but as they receive their diploma are 
greeted with “why haven’t you married and had a child yet?” by society. By the time 
these women are ready to marry and have children, they are considered too old or too 
powerful or too wealthy and not appealing to many men, and in turn are unable to find a 
partner to settle down. Then, as the rest of China sees them, they become a shengnü, and 
are faced with the daily onslaught of media, societal, and family pressures to marry 
quickly and bear a child. However, if a woman values marriage more than education, and 
foregoes educational opportunities for matrimony, some would argue that she was wast-
ing her parents’ hard work in her upbringing and not setting herself up for success, or that 
her lack of education is not beneficial to a highly successful man’s image. In either deci-
sion, a young Chinese woman is faced with negative responses that are seemingly only 
avoidable by achieving some sort of education then giving it up to have a child. The 
shengnü is locked in the vicious circle of society’s disapproval.  
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When considering the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign, it is hard not to 
believe what the Internet is broadcasting; the sheer magnitude of anti-shengnü rhetoric 
available online easily leads viewers to believe that the shengnü is too picky, or that she 
does have a personality disorder, or that she is the reason why so many men cannot find a 
wife. Endless reposts of the same article fill up entire pages of search results online, and a 
viewer would have a hard time disagreeing with dozens of otherwise convincing posts 
that shengnü is bad. In this milieu, the thoughts, opinions, and answers of the shengnü are 
buried deep beneath articles about her “problems,” and her voice, and who she really is, 
is lost upon society. However, among the countless anti-shengnü articles, several voices 
via blogs and other social media posts have proclaimed “I am a shengnü!” The existence 
of such proclamations should be indicative of a small pushback against the “leftover 
women phenomenon” campaign and the aggressiveness of the Chinese government to-
wards gender norms; however, most of these female bloggers wear the shengnü label as a 
badge of shame. Few female bloggers are truly accepting of the term “shengnü” and re-
jecting of the self-help guides – the majority of the Chinese Internet’s shengnü are 
ashamed of their singlehood and cling to society’s diagnosis of their “problems” hoping 
to “fix” themselves and re-conform back to normalcy.  
 Since conception of the “leftover women” term, much has been written on both 
China’s shengnü – who they are, why they are single, what they should do in order to 
marry, etc., and male and female gender norms in the 21st century. When researching this 
topic, the available literature combined economics and gender, sometimes displaying 
gender and identity as a result of economics, and sometimes showing that economics was 
in some way fueled by gender and identity. The discussion surrounding Chinese women’s 
10 
 
identity is inextricably tied to economics, and as such, so is the shengnü’s identity. Works 
by Leta Hong Fincher and Wang Zheng provide the most in-depth analysis of the modern 
Chinese woman’s economic standing, with some additional discussion of gender and 
identity, while works by Susan Brownell, Jeffrey Wasserstrom, and Elisabeth Croll detail 
the Chinese idea of femininity and female gender norms, with supporting economic evi-
dence. These works are useful in examining Chinese women in the 21st century and in 
what kind of environment the shengnü exists.  
The only book published on the “leftover women phenomenon” is Leta Hong 
Fincher's Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China.17 Fincher de-
scribes in detail the creation of the term “shengnü,” how Chinese women have been left 
out of one of the largest economic opportunities in Chinas history via the housing market, 
and the current state of domestic violence and women’s rights in mainland China. The 
main narrative of her book argues that the term “shengnü” is a government tactic to 
frighten highly-educated, high-quality women to forfeit their economic standing to marry 
and produce a child for the betterment of the state rather than personal fulfilment. All of 
the other chapters and components stem from this claim. While Fincher tends to focus 
more heavily on the economic aspects of the shengnü identity, her work is invaluable 
when establishing an accurate depiction of the shengnü and what has been done in re-
sistance to this label. Another leading scholar of Chinese women’s identity is Wang 
Zheng, associate professor of History and Women’s Studies and associate scientist of the 
Institute for Research on Women and Gender at the University of Michigan. Zheng’s ar-
                                                 
17 Leta Hong Fincher, Leftover Women: The Resurgence of Gender Inequality in China (London: Zed 
Books, 2014). 
11 
 
ticle, “Gender, Employment, and Women’s Resistance,”18 complements Fincher’s detail-
ing of the shengnü’s economic identity. Zheng provides a detailed account of the urban 
middle class woman and changes in employment patterns in times of economic reform 
and during leaps to “modernity.” Zheng also provides a brief overview of feminist voices 
and strategies in mainland China, similar to Fincher’s conclusions. Fincher and Zheng’s 
works are crucial in establishing a solid foundation to analyze both the 21st century Chi-
nese woman and the “leftover women phenomenon.” Both are crucial works when ana-
lyzing who the urban, middle class shengnü really is and why she is persecuted by both 
the state and society. Both Fincher and Zheng argue that these shengnü women are a 
product of their economic surroundings yet the environment that produced the “leftover 
women phenomenon” is rejecting them, thus creating their identity through what they are 
not economically.  
In the same vein as Fincher and Zheng’s analysis, Susan Brownell, Jeffrey Was-
serstrom, and Elisabeth Croll discuss gender and identity with supporting economic de-
tails. In Susan Brownell and Jeffrey Wasserstrom’s Chinese Femininities/Chinese Mascu-
linities, the two provide ideas of gender throughout various time periods in Chinese histo-
ry, as detailed by various authors.19 The entire book focuses on the changing nature of 
gender and identity for Chinese males and females, sometimes progressive in nature, 
while sometimes regressive in nature, all as following general economic trends. One de-
tailing in particular by Harriet Evans titled, “Past, Perfect or Imperfect: Changing Images 
                                                 
18 Wang Zheng, “Gender, Employment and Women’s Resistance,” in Chinese Society: Change, Conflict 
and Resistance, 2nd ed., ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, (London and New York: Routledge Cur-
zon, 2003), 158-182, http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/ChiPol/WangZhengChinWomen.pdf. 
19 Susan Brownell and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, eds., Chinese Femininities/Chinese Masculinities (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 2002), 331-360.  
12 
 
of the Ideal Wife,” discusses the “continuity” of gender norms throughout the reform era 
and the “state’s new attention to issues of sexuality [appearing] to be as much a strategy 
of control as a liberation of sexual behavior.”20 Evans discusses the “ideal” wife and 
mother, and what that identity means in contrast to the masculine counter-narrative estab-
lished throughout the reform era. In Elisabeth Croll’s book Endangered Daughters: Dis-
crimination and Development in Asia, she discusses Chinese daughters (in sections titled, 
“Wishing for a son,” “Rural demands,” “Urban preference,” and “Daughter neglect”) and 
how the economic standing of most families helped aid in male-preference.21 Croll also 
familiarizes the reader with discussion pertaining to the “cultures of gender, divisions of 
labor, gender perceptions, and gender development,” which aid in once again combining 
gender, identity, and economics. Brownell, Wasserstrom, Evans, and Croll corroborate 
evidence given by Fincher and Zheng that the modern Chinese woman, who she is and 
how she lives, has been shaped by (sometimes unfair) economics. The modern Chinese 
woman, including shengnü, can be seen as a reaction, or an effect, of economics shaping 
gender and identity.  
 In this project, I will examine the inevitable formation of China’s shengnü from 
the changing marriage patterns, image of shengnü that is propagated by the media’s “left-
over women phenomenon” campaign, and if and how shengnü are resisting this image. 
This project will also briefly consider the possible emergence of a civil society22 from the 
                                                 
20 Harriet Evans, “Past, Perfect or Imperfect: Changing Images of the Ideal Wife,” in Chinese Feminini-
ties/Chinese Masculinities, eds. Susan Brownell and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and 
London: University of California Press, 2002), 335-360.  
21 Elisabeth Croll, Endangered Daughters: Discrimination and Development in Asia (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2000). 
22 “Civil society” is defined by the World Health Organization as a “wide range of organizations, networks, 
associations, groups and movements that are independent from government and that sometimes come to-
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combined efforts of individual bloggers and high-profiled women’s rights activists fol-
lowing the creation of the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign. I hypothesize that 
because the shengnü is a product of her surroundings (as the aforementioned authors also 
argue), that she should be adamantly opposed to the unjust label “shengnü” and actively 
pursuing to reclaim the title and fight for equality within the economic and social spheres. 
However, because the overwhelming amount of information provided on Chinese search 
engines, databases, and blogging sites promotes the anti-shengnü rhetoric established by 
the early ACWF’s articles, it is difficult to find many female voices behind the shengnü 
label, especially voices coming together to work together, thus impeding any break-
throughs by Chinese feminist voices to create a civil society. While several blogs and 
posts written by self-proclaimed shengnü do exist, the majority of these women are not 
proud of the title “shengnü.” The “leftover women phenomenon” campaign broadcasted 
by the media is highly effective in depicting the shengnü outside of established gender 
roles; the counter-narrative to the anti-shengnü discourse exists, where women are proud 
of their achievements, but after almost a decade since the term “shengnü” was created, 
these voices have made little impact in society, and the term remains highly negative. The 
voices of anti-shengnü bloggers, however few, do not make the case for an emerging civil 
society, one where women take back the title and work towards women’s rights. Howev-
er, the combination of pro-shengnü voices and demonstrations by well-known women’s 
rights activists could be the start of an emerging civil society, or at the very least the crea-
tion of public acknowledgement and eventually acceptance of single, highly-educated 
women.  
                                                                                                                                                 
gether to advance their common interests through collective action” 
(http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story006/en/). 
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This thesis is divided into four chapters, the first of which will examine the 
changing nature of marriage in China and the inevitability of “shengnü.” Specifically, 
chapter one discusses changing marriage patterns from the Qing Dynasty to present 
through analysis of age at first union patterns. The second chapter will examine media 
portrayals of shengnü in articles and images. Chapter two will also explain the relation-
ship between mass media and society and will utilize English-language articles23 posted 
by the ACWF, non-ACWF articles, and images from other sources to provide a portrayal 
of China’s shengnü in the media’s “leftover women phenomenon” campaign. When ac-
quiring and analyzing media articles, I first used ACWF articles, then searched various 
keywords or phrases on Baidu search engine to find the most popular shengnü articles 
and images; I then took note of the overall message the article or image was sending, and 
how this message influence the image of the shengnü. The third chapter will establish an 
accurate picture of how China’s shengnü view themselves. To do this, I searched the 
same keywords and phrases on blogging sites Sina Weibo, Tinya, and RenRen; I then 
took note of whether or not the blogger was a female proclaiming to be shengnü, and 
whether or not she viewed this positively, and for what reasons. To conclude chapter 
three, I will consider if the few pro-shengnü bloggers online, combined with demonstra-
tions of famous women’s rights activists makes the case for an emerging civil society, or 
if the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign has successfully fragmented single, high-
ly-educated women.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The Chinese language website for the All-China Women’s Federation has the same articles posted on the 
English language website, but are harder to track down 
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CHAPTER 1: CHANGING MARRIAGE PATTERNS IN URBAN CHINA AND THE 
INEVITABILITY OF SINGLE WOMEN  
 
 
 The persistence of traditional marriage views and gender roles in modern Chinese 
society can be viewed as an obstacle to individual goals and interests, and groups of 
women such as shengnü bear heavy criticism from much of society for disregarding es-
tablished societal norms. In order to fully understand the existence of the “leftover wom-
en phenomenon” and how shengnü remained single past their so-called expiration date, a 
brief summary of Chinese marriage practices and how the marriage market exists today is 
detailed below.  
Marriage and family have been fundamental parts of Chinese society and culture 
throughout its history, albeit existing in a way that restrains and restricts a woman’s live-
lihood. Newborn girls were destined for a life of wifehood and expected to bear a son to 
continue the practice of ancestor worship and prove her worth to her marriage family. 
Until a girl married, she possessed no basic human rights. There existed no right to have 
sex before marriage for a girl, and no house was allocated to her by her danwei [govern-
ment work unit] before marriage during the Maoist era.24 While sharing some character-
istics with various other countries, historic Chinese marriage patterns are vastly different 
from what has been practiced in the West. Maynes and Walter explain that “the Chinese 
marriage system was traditionally characterized by early age at marriage, nearly universal 
marriage for women, virilocal residence (a newly married couple resided with the 
groom’s parents), concubinage for elite men, and norms that discouraged widow remar-
                                                 
24 Christina Larson, “The Startling Plight of China's Leftover Ladies,” All China Women's Federation, April 
24, 2012, accessed October 11, 2014, 
http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/news/sports/14/404-1.htm. 
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riage.”25 These patterns characterized marriage through late imperial China. During this 
time virtually all Chinese girls became brides, though not all of them married as principal 
wives, and all Chinese women were born to become a bride and subjected to the instruc-
tion of their husband.26  
The Republican era (1911-1949) experienced a series of social, economic, and politi-
cal revolutions that expanded women’s rights and subsequently modernized the practice 
of marriage. In 1950, just a year after the establishment of the People’s Republic of Chi-
na, the New Marriage Law (an improved reworking of the marriage law in the Jiangxi 
Soviet Republic in 1931) was written into the new legal framework, granting women the 
right to a divorce. Niida states that “the new Marriage Law enacted in May 1950 is based 
on a philosophy negating the old Chinese marriage system, the nature of which may be 
inferred from the expression: ‘noodles do not make a meal; likewise, women are not 
counted as human beings.’”27 Niida continues to state that “throughout the successive 
stages of development, the reform of the marriage law in revolutionary-period China has 
been geared to a consistent, basic aim - the upholding of the principles of free marriage, 
monogamy, equal rights for men and women and the negation of feudalistic and patriar-
chal marriage practices centered on the interests of the family, husbands and males - such 
as bigamy, concubinage, child marriage and human traffic marriage.”28   
                                                 
25 Mary Jo Maynes and Ann Waltner, "Women's Life-Cycle Transitions in a World-Historical Perspective: 
Comparing Marriage in China and Europe," in Journal of Women's History 12 (Winter 2001): 11.  
26 Maynes and Waltner, “Women’s Life-Cycle Transitions in a World-Historical Perspective: Comparing 
Marriage in China and Europe,” 11.   
27 Noboru Niida, “Land Reform and New Marriage Law in China,” The Developing Economies 2 (1964): 3-
4, accessed October 9, 2015, doi: 10.1111/j.1746-1049.1964.tb00667.x.  
28 Niida, “Land Reform and New Marriage Law in China,” 6. 
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Prior to the 1950 New Marriage Law, women were seen as property, like noodles, 
and some went so far as to explain that a one-year-old girl was worth one “shih” of grains 
and her value increased by one “koku” per year as she grew up.29 Traditional Confucian 
values further depreciated the value of a woman, as “the husband is the ‘heaven’ for the 
wife, as the wife was rooted in the lot of the peasant, whose wife could not afford to leave 
her husband no matter how badly she might be treated because she had no hope of living 
by herself.”30 The New Marriage Law greatly impacted the lives of Chinese women. No 
longer were women compared to noodles or forever tied to their husbands. In accordance 
with Mao Zedong’s slogan “women hold up half the sky,” the mid-twentieth century fos-
tered positive growth for women in China where women were actively participating in 
politics and strengthening the state. “Men and women are equal; everyone is worth his (or 
her) salt,” during Mao’s time.31 The New Marriage Law of 1950 also saw an increase in 
women’s economic rights, where land ownership and participation in cooperatives were 
possible. This is one of the first moments in Chinese history that women have been grant-
ed immense and unprecedented freedoms, and the effects of this liberation have had a 
lasting impact on the lives of successive generations.  
During the past few decades, Chinese marriage trends have continued to transmute in-
to a more Western style of practice. Several new defining features characterize marriage 
in present-day China. Since the 1980s, researchers have consistently identified five 
unique features of Chinese marriage, several of which are eerily similar to pre-
Republican marriage features and suggest that Chinese marriage, while changing and 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 3. 
30 Ibid, 4. 
31 Ibid, 10-11.  
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modernizing, still possesses some backwards characteristics, like the deeply engrained 
gender norms that say a man is to work and provide for the family, while the woman is to 
stay inside and manage household affairs. First, marriage in China is universal, meaning 
that everyone participates or is expected to participate in marriage.32 Second, marriage 
patterns are characterized by early marriage compared to developed countries, yet with 
the average age at first union increasing in a linear fashion over recent decades.33 Third, 
female hypergamy is present, where women seek to find a man of higher age, wealth, and 
education for marriage.34 Fourth, there is a marriage squeeze, where there are not enough 
women for all the men to marry, owing to skewed sex ratios at birth and a generation of 
excess males.35 Finally, marriage in China is seen as a necessary precursor to family for-
mation – where the old rhyme “first comes love, then comes marriage, then comes so-
and-so pushing a baby carriage” rings true and is upheld as the correct sequence of life 
events in China.36  
                                                 
32 G Barclay, A. Coale, M. Stoto and T. Trussell, “A Reassessment of the Demography 
of Traditional Rural China,” in Population Index 42(1976): 606-635. 
33 W. Wang and W. Yang, “Age at Marriage and the First Birth Interval: The 
Emerging Change in Sexual Behavior Among Young Couples in China,” in Population 
and Development Review 22(1996): 229-320;  
H. Y. Tien, “Age at Marriage in the People's Republic of China,” in The China Quarterly 93(1983): 90-
107; 
E. E. Pimentel, “Just How Do I Love Thee? Marital Relations in Urban China,” in Journal of Marriage and 
Family 62(2000): 32-47. 
34 Elisabeth Croll, The Politics of Marriage in Contemporary China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, 1981). 
35 Stuart Basten, “Family planning restrictions and a generation of excess males: analysis of national and 
provincial data from the 2010 Census of China,” in Oxford Centre for Population Research Working Paper 
59(2012).   
C. Z. Guilmoto, “Skewed sex ratios at birth and future marriage squeeze in China 
and India 2005-2100,” in Demography 49(2012), 77-100; 
 K. Trent and S.J. South, “Too many men? Sex ratios and women's partnering behavior in China,” in Social 
Forces 90(2011): 247-267. 
36 Wei Yan, Jiang Quanbao, and Stuart Basten, "Observing the Transformation of China's First Marriage 
Pattern through Net Nuptiality Tables: 1982-2010," in Finnish Yearbook of Population Re-
search 48(September 2013): 65-75.  
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What is most interesting about these five defining characteristics is that the second 
feature, early age of marriage, is increasing in a linear fashion. An increasing average age 
at first union indicates that women are waiting longer to marry. This increase “threatens” 
the Chinese marriage market, where women traditionally marry young and produce a 
child right away. Now, more women are either waiting longer to marry and have chil-
dren, or foregoing marriage altogether.37 An increasing age at first union is due to natural 
changes in contemporary marriage patterns38, which correlates with economic and educa-
tional gains made by Chinese women over the past few decades.  
 The graph below was taken from an open-source data site, Knoema39, and depicts 
the average age at first union for men and women in urban China since 1982.40 Repre-
sented is an increase in age at first union of females from 22.40 years of age in 1982 to 
24.70 years of age in 2010 – a 2.3 year increase across 30 years. For men, the age of first 
marriage in 1982 was 25.10 years of age. Since 1982, the age of first marriage for men 
has increased by roughly 1 year, to 26.50 years of age at first union in 2010. The graph 
indicates that both men and women are marrying later in life, and that average age at first 
is likely to continue in the future. 
 
                                                 
37 A. J. Cherlin, “First Union Patterns Around the World: Introduction to the Special Issue,” in 
Springer Science+Business Media (2013). 
38The five characteristics of Chinese marriage as depicted on the previous page still exist in China today, 
yet in recent years, more liberal or alternative relationship styles (as seen by the Chinese government) have 
come to the forefront of marriage culture. Cohabitation and divorce rates are on the rise, as well as a signif-
icant increase in tolerance towards homosexuality. 
39 The data is taken from census reports published by the Chinese government over four periods, repub-
lished by the Health Nutrition and Population Statistics from the World Bank in January of 2015, and then 
graphed and republished by Knoema. 
40 “Health Nutrition and Population Statistics (World Bank): Age at First Union, Male and Female,” last 
modified January 2015, http://knoema.com/WBHNPStats2015Jan/health-nutrition-and-population-
statistics-world-bank-january-2015?tsId=1578570&action=export. 
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Figure 1.1: 
Age of First Marriage in China (1982-2010)
 
Source: Knoema 
 
In 2012, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs published 
the World Marriage Data report on the Marital Status of Men and Women to depict mar-
riage trends across the world.41 The data supplied by various data collection agencies and 
surveys and gathered and organized by the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, grouped individual countries’ marital data (percentage of men/women 
single/married/widowed/divorced) by time period, providing a numeric representation of 
marriage trends worldwide. From the previous graph, it is evident that average age at first 
union is increasing over time, and the World Marriage Data report is useful in showing 
exactly how many men and women as a percentage of their respective age groups are re-
maining single over time. 
The graph below depicts varying levels of single men and women in various age 
groups as percentages of the total population of each age group. From 1990 on for both 
                                                 
41 “World Marriage Data 2012,” last modified January 2013, 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/dataset/marriage/wmd2012.shtml. 
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sexes, each age group saw an increase in number of individuals remaining single later in 
life. The second graph shows the three age groups over time for just single women. The 
age group that coincides with a younger shengnü, the 25-29 age group, experienced a 
huge increase in percentage from 2000 to 2010. The other two age groups, 30-34 and 35-
39, also experienced dramatic increases during that time relative to their previous values. 
Research by Yan Wei, Quanbao Jiang, and Stuart Basten supports the idea that “patterns 
of singlehood have changed at younger ages, with an ever increasing period of single-
hood, especially for males,” which can be seen on both graphs below.42 The conclusions 
made in their report coincide with the data analysis several researchers have conducted 
and that the following graphs confirm: there is an increase in the amount of single males 
and females over time, for all age groups, and this trend is indicative of changing mar-
riage patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Wei Yan, Jiang Quanbao and Stuart Basten. "Observing the Transformation of China's First Marriage 
Pattern through Net Nuptiality Tables: 1982-2010."  
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Figure 1.2:  
Single Men as Percentage of Total Age Group, China (1982-2010) 
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Marriage Data 
 
Figure 1.3:  
Single Women as Percentage of Total Age Group, China (1982-2010) 
Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Marriage Data 
The fluctuation in age at first marriage (where some years the average age is higher or 
lower), correlates with changes in the social structure of society (movement away from or 
toward traditional marriage customs) and in the labor market (increased or decreased par-
ticipation). As more women stay in school longer or choose to play an active role in the 
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labor market, the opportunity cost of finding a spouse and producing offspring increases, 
and in turn average age at first union increases. For men, the increases in percentages of 
those remaining single is less defined than those for women. Men historically tend to 
marry later in Chinese society, but the increase of singles over time could be in part due 
to an increase of females remaining single longer. Also at play is the effects of the One 
Child Policy’s male-preference culture, where increasing amounts of males were born 
each year, suggesting that the percentages of singles in each age group would also in-
crease each year.  
In the case of China’s “leftover women phenomenon,” many researchers have cited 
availability of education as the main reason why more women are staying single longer or 
staying single as a lifestyle. An inverse relationship between marriage and education ex-
ists, where well-educated women marry “late and less often.”43 This trend is explained by 
the economic independence theory, which posits that education provides women with in-
dependent economic resources to reject the caregiver role in marriage. Education reduces 
women’s likelihood of marriage because highly-educated women may view marriage as a 
“less attractive option than continuing to work outside the home.”44 Felicia Tian explains 
that 
“Though education provides women with increased earning potential, the 
relative deterioration of their labor market conditions makes it difficult to 
transform the benefits of education into household bargaining power. 
Thus, college-educated Chinese women who feel more attached to the la-
bor market and hold egalitarian gender attitudes are even more reluctant to 
enter marriage, an institution that is increasingly differentiated by tradi-
tional gender roles. In addition, the gender-asymmetric mate selection 
                                                 
43 Felicia Tian. "Transition to First Marriage in Reform-Era Urban China: The Persistent Effect of Educa-
tion in a Period of Rapid Social Change." Population Research & Policy Review 32, no. 4 (August 2013): 
529-552.  
44 Ibid. 
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preference also makes it more difficult for highly educated women to find 
desirable partners.”45 
 
In short, women with higher education are less likely to marry, or marry later, increasing 
the average age at first union over time. However, in data released by the World Bank in 
2014 and graphed on Knoema, percentage of females in secondary education has de-
creased slightly since 2009, and total enrollment of females in secondary education has 
dropped significantly from 2006 to 2012, both depicted in the graph below.46 Additional-
ly, the percentage of female participation in the labor force has also decreased from 2006 
to present, depicted in a second graph below.47 Information depicted in both of these 
graphs conflicts with the idea that increasing education and economic (labor force) op-
portunities will lead to more singles over time, creating the “leftover women phenome-
non.” While education and economic opportunities do provide evidence for the inevitabil-
ity of shengnü, there must be something else at play causing women to stay single longer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Ibid.  
46 “Education Statistics, World Bank (2014),” last modified September 2014, 
http://knoema.com/WBEdStats2014Dec/education-statistics-world-bank-december-2014. 
47 Ibid.   
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Figure 1.4:  
Percentage and Total Enrollment of Females in Secondary Education (2006-2012) 
 
Source: Knoema   
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Figure 1.5:  
Percentage of Female in Total Labor Force (2006-2012) 
 
Source: Knoema  
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While female education and participation in the labor force are both causes for the 
increase in average age at first union and the number of singles in China, these factors do 
not explain either the existence of the “leftover women phenomenon,” or how the number 
of singles is increasingly yearly despite recent drops in school enrollment and labor force 
participation. The economic independence theory alone does not adequately address the 
importance of “cultural and historical continuity in marriage formation that sometimes 
causes early average age at first union to fluctuate.”48 Tian discusses the “path dependen-
cy theory,” which emphasizes the importance of culture and institutions that “constrain 
family change and legitimizes marriage as a fundamental and structural component of 
societal and individual identity.”49 Non-marriage has a high social penalty, which can be 
viewed as “deviant, illegal, or anti-social.”50 Being a shengnü is equivalent to being an 
outsider in Chinese society, not just in terms of high education and economic attainment, 
but because of deviation from accepted cultural norms or gender norms (i.e. enrollment in 
higher education or participation in the labor force). Evidence also suggests that the stig-
matized labeling of “being single” in China and being called “shengnü” both indicated a 
woman’s personal failures to participate in cultural norms and institutions. As such, since 
the shengnü term’s creation in 2006, both enrollment rates and labor force participation 
rates have declined (there is correlation, causation is yet to be determined), while there 
has been an increase in single females across every age group. Lower enrollment rates 
and labor force rates should lead to higher rates of marriage (and lower percentages of 
single females), since the female is abiding by cultural and gendered norms, but from the 
                                                 
48 Felicia Tian, "Transition to First Marriage in Reform-Era Urban China: The Persistent Effect of Educa-
tion in a Period of Rapid Social Change."  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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World Marriage Data, this hypothesis does not hold. One possible reason for why more 
women are remaining single as fewer enroll in school or participate in the workforce is 
that the stigmatized shengnü label has caused many women to fear that they, too will be-
come an ostracized, marginalized member of society, so they are backing off from educa-
tion or work in order to re-conform to cultural and gendered norms. The stigma associat-
ed with single status prevents highly-educated women from rejecting marriage complete-
ly or postponing it for too long, but when they give up their careers or education, they are 
still remaining single.51  
China’s “leftover women phenomenon” was inevitable. A series of economic re-
forms and legislative policies52, along with an increase of educational opportunities, pro-
vided several facets for the modern Chinese woman to finally reach some sort of inde-
pendence, so in full force Chinese women rushed to obtain MA’s, PhD’s, and jobs. How-
ever, the government never intended for increased educational and economic opportuni-
ties to result in a decline in marriage. The Chinese government, as mentioned by Fincher, 
wants women to receive diplomas and have careers, but only in order to give them up and 
help “upgrade population quality.” But, due to deeply engrained gender norms, the wom-
en who are supposed to “upgrade [the] population quality” are unable to find a husband, 
and the yearly percentage of single females increases, thus strengthening the “leftover 
women phenomenon.” Changing marriage rates (higher percentages of singles) indicates 
movement away from traditional marriage values and towards a more progressive society 
(in terms of educational and economic opportunities), yet do decreasing enrollment and 
                                                 
51 Ibid.  
52 A list of these economic reforms and legislative policies that directly influence the lives of women can be 
seen in the appendices.  
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labor force participation rates suggest that society is shifting back to these same tradition-
al marriage values and gender norms since the creation of the “leftover women phenome-
non” media campaign? What is the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign, propagated 
by the state-run media, doing in order to convince viewers that being a single, highly-
educated shengnü is to be avoided at all costs? 
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CHAPTER 2: THE STATE MEDIA PORTRAYAL OF SHENGNÜ 
 
The way we view ourselves, others, and the world around us is shaped by the om-
nipresent mass media outlets and the onslaught of words and images that these outlets 
broadcast. The effects of mass media on society has long been a topic of research and de-
bate for social scientists, especially in the 21st century where news and information is 
spread via newer and faster social media platforms. Social scientists agree that mass me-
dia strongly influences society and the individual, yet to what degree and in what exact 
terms these effects happen are still disputed. There are roughly five functions of the me-
dia that most researchers can agree on. 
“First, the media can attract and direct attention to problems, solutions or 
people in ways which can favor those with power and correlatively divert 
attention from rival individuals or groups. Second, the mass media can 
confer status and confirm legitimacy. Third, in some circumstances, the 
media can be a channel for persuasion and mobilization. Fourth, the mass 
media can help to bring certain kinds of publics into being and maintain 
them. Fifth, the media are a vehicle for offering psychic rewards and grati-
fications. They can divert and amuse and they can flatter. In general, mass 
media are very cost-effective as a means of communication in society, 
they are also fast, flexible, and relatively easy to plan and control…”53 
 
These functions depict the power that mass media is capable of in any given soci-
ety or situation including China and the “leftover women phenomenon.” The in-
fluence and effects of mass media and the most important media situations for 
assessing influence and effectiveness are broken down into “five categories: (1) 
                                                 
53 Denis McQuail, "The Influence and Effects of Mass Media" in Mass Communication Theory: An Intro-
duction (London: Sage Publications, 1983), 21. 
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the campaign; (2) the definition of social reality and social norms; (3) the imme-
diate response or reaction; (4) institutional change; (5) changes in culture and so-
ciety.”54 The campaign and the definition of social reality and social norms are 
crucial in understanding the Chinese media’s “leftover women phenomenon,” and 
should be discussed before specific media examples are analyzed.  
 In China’s “leftover women phenomenon” the campaign is an attempt to inform 
the public of the existence of highly-educated single women and to encourage those who 
know of a shengnü to take it upon themselves to encourage her to marry quickly and pro-
duce a child. Since its country-wide debut in 2007, the shengnü campaign has reached 
nearly every news station, newspaper, blogging site, and has been projected into the 
minds of each single, highly-educated woman.  The “leftover women phenomenon” cam-
paign is defined by the general characteristics of a media campaign: 
“The [general media] campaign shares, in varying degrees, the following 
characteristics: it has specific aims and is planned to achieve these; it has a 
definite time-span, usually short; it is intensive and aims at wide coverage; 
its effectiveness is, in principle, open to assessment; it usually has authori-
tative sponsorship; it is not necessarily popular with its audience and has 
to be ‘sold’ to them; it is usually based on a framework of shared val-
ues.”55 
 McQuail explains that “the message that the campaign sends should be unambiguous and 
relevant to its audience, while reinforcing existing opinions to achieve success,” where 
the most effective campaigns rely on information-spreading, unlike campaigns that seek 
to “change attitudes or opinions.”56 The “leftover women phenomenon” campaign is in-
formative in nature, yet this was done purposefully in order to change attitude and opin-
ions of the viewers by providing information that is seemingly undebatable. 
                                                 
54 McQuail, "The Influence and Effects of Mass Media," 11. 
55 Ibid, 12. 
56 Ibid.  
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In China, the message of the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign is clear to 
parents and older generations: if your daughter does not get married and produce a child 
(by solving the “problems” we provide information on how to “fix”), your family lineage 
will end, and there will be no one to take care of you or her. For already married peers of 
a shengnü, the message is also clear: your friend needs help to be happy like you (and she 
can do so by “fixing” her “problems” with the information we provide). The message is 
clearest to the shengnü themselves: there is something wrong with you and you must rec-
tify it before you can find a husband (and you can do so by looking at our information on 
how to “fix” your “problems”). The message is promoting traditional Confucian ideals 
and marriage norms to each of its viewers, and thus endemically reinforcing anachronis-
tic ideas that a woman must “fix” herself to serve in a male-dominated society. By target-
ing parents and peers in addition to the shengnü, the “leftover women phenomenon” 
campaign is highly effective; family and peers are paying attention to these women’s 
lives and doing exactly what the government wishes them to do: encourage these women 
to give up some aspect of themselves to marry and have children for the “betterment” of 
the state. Since most media in China is owned and sponsored by the government, the 
message is ubiquitous. “The more channels carrying the same campaign messages, the 
greater the probability of acceptance,” and in turn the more shengnü who will give up 
their careers or goals for marriage.57  
 On the definition of social reality and the formation of social norms in the “lefto-
ver women phenomenon” context, there are two main points to what occurs during a 
campaign. There is the “provision of a consistent picture of the social world which may 
                                                 
57 Ibid, 13. 
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lead the audience to adopt this version of reality, a reality of ‘facts’ and of norms, values, 
and expectations.”58 Also present is a “continuing and selective interaction between self 
and the media which plays a part in shaping the individual’s own behavior and self-
concept.”59 Viewers can begin to expect the mass media to tell them about “different 
kinds of social roles and the accompanying expectations, in the sphere of work, family 
life, political behavior and so on.”60 Because there are almost no truly independent news 
agencies in China (since every agency must be cognizant of government censorship and 
abide by unwritten rules or risk being “asked to tea” by government officials), the “lack 
of diversity of media does not allow ample choice nor healthy contradictions” to the 
“leftover women phenomenon.”61 Additionally, “terms like ‘amplification’ and ‘sensiti-
zation’ and ‘polarization’ have been used to describe the tendency of the media to exag-
gerate the incident of a phenomenon, to increase the likelihood of it being noticed and to 
mobilize society against a supposed threat.”62 The “supposed threat” to Chinese society is 
the group of highly-educated, single urban women. This group of single, highly-educated 
women “receives the polarizing treatment, and comparable to other targets of the media, 
are relatively small in number, rather powerless, and already subject to broad social dis-
approval.”63 
 Researchers and analysts have suggested that the “media helps to establish an or-
der of priorities in a society about its problems and objectives.”64 McQuail believes that 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid, 14. 
61 Ibid. This statement does not include personal blogs which do not often possess the scope that the gov-
ernment news agencies have. 
62 Ibid, 15. 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid, 16.  
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“they do this, not by initiating or determining, but by publicizing according to an agreed 
scale of values that is determined elsewhere, usually in the political system.”65 To coun-
ter China’s “leftover women phenomenon,” the government has utilized the ACWF to 
encourage single women to change themselves to be more desirable for marriage. Outside 
of the ACWF articles, other articles have been published and circulated among other 
Chinese news and blog sites. These articles share the same headlines or the same content 
and can be be seen on a dozen or more sites through one search. The uniformity and repe-
tition of the “leftover women phenomenon” message are essential to the campaign; the 
“more consistent the picture presented and the more exclusively this picture gains wide 
attention, then the predicted effect is more likely to occur.”66 The more one article or im-
age is republished by various news or blog sites, then the more people are exposed to a 
certain depiction of the shengnü and the more likely it is that this depiction is likely to be 
believed and opinions formed by the public. The more an article or picture depicts 
shengnü at odds with societal norms and gender norms, the more likely it is for the “left-
over women phenomenon” to dissolve, since the message circulates at higher volumes, 
and more women succumb to pressure to marry. 
 This chapter will evaluate two different types of media that have an important role 
in the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign. Print media concerning the shengnü 
play the most integral role in determining public and state opinion on the shengnü. The 
main print media source for shengnü news and discussion is the All-China Women’s 
Federation, where the earliest Chinese-language articles that carried the most pejorative 
view of shengnü originated. The ACWF has published several dozen articles pertaining 
                                                 
65 Ibid, 16. 
66 Ibid, 16. 
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to shengnü. These articles have been picked up by various other Chinese news sites 
online, but the original ACWF articles have been deleted. The ACWF carries a sense of 
governmental authority backing up their articles and opinions, while the non-ACWF 
articles that are circulated carry the authority of popular opinion. 
  The second media used in the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign is that of 
the reoccurring images used in shengnü articles, since certain cartoon images of the 
shengnü have a wider breadth on the internet than the articles do. To discuss the role of 
cartoon and photograph images in the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign, a brief 
discussion of how images shape individuals and society psychologically will be provided, 
then the photos will be grouped into common themes and analyzed for meaning and ef-
fectiveness. The combination of text and images in the “leftover women phenomenon” 
campaign provides a powerful and compelling image of the single, highly-educated Chi-
nese woman that many people, including a shengnü herself, are likely to believe due to 
pervasiveness. 
 
The ACWF and Reoccurring Articles  
 
 As stated on their English language website, the All-China Women's Federation 
(ACWF) was founded on April 3, 1949 as a mass organization for uniting and emancipat-
ing the women of all nationalities and walks of life in China. Officially, the ACWF is a 
“non-governmental organization,” formed out of the movement to “eradicate the idea that 
women are inferior to men,”67 promote the social and economic welfare of women, and 
                                                 
67 Justina Ka Yee Tsui, “Chinese Women: Active Revolutionaries or Passive Followers? A History of the 
All-China Women’s Federation, 1949-1996,” (Master’s thesis, Concordia University, 1998). 
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act as an “umbrella organ for existing women’s organizations,”68 all while acting under 
the male-dominate Chinese government. Four years after its founding and after gaining 
wide support and popularity among the newly-liberated Chinese women, the ACWF had 
a staff of 40,000 counting just the levels about counties and municipalities, reaching more 
than 70,000 branches by 1994.69 The size of the ACWF implies that it plays an important 
role in Chinese women’s daily lives and that messages and opinions of the ACWF are 
far-reaching.  
 Overall, the ACWF has positively impacted the lives of and empowered the coun-
try’s women in various ways, yet not everyone is convinced the organization has wom-
en’s best interests at heart. Non-governmental women’s organizations or independent 
feminists have argued that the ACWF is not a true supporter of women’s rights or wom-
en’s groups (as many of these groups are unable to obtain funding or support) and its role 
in women’s lives is more detrimental than beneficial. Wang Zheng, for instance, argues 
that the Women’s Federation consists of ‘state feminists,’ or “feminist mouthpieces uti-
lized by the state to further its agenda.”70 Many believe that the ACWF would undoubt-
edly choose to be in good favor with the government than truly push for increased wom-
en’s rights, with Zheng arguing that the ACWF is “no more than an organ of the party-
state that takes on the project of making Chinese women into statist subjects.”71  
                                                 
68 Tania Angeloff, and Marylène Lieber, “Equality, did you say? Chinese feminism after 30 years of re-
forms,” in China Perspectives 4(December 2012): 17-24. 
69 Wang Zheng, “‘State Feminism’? Gender and Socialist State Formation in Maoist China,” in Feminist 
Studies 31(2005): 519-551; Jude Howell, "The struggle for survival: Prospects for the Women's Federation 
in Post-Mao China," in World Development 1(1996): 129–143. 
70 Wang Zheng, “‘State Feminism’? Gender and Socialist State Formation in Maoist China.” This ‘state 
feminist’ is a contradictory term, as in the centralized patriarchal state that is the PRC, laws and policies 
supposedly favoring women were not always clear de facto terms until the 1980s. 
71 Wang Zheng, “‘State Feminism’? Gender and Socialist State Formation in Maoist China,” 520. 
37 
 
In the 21st century, the ACWF has continued to play an active role in women’s 
lives, publishing news reports and offering services from various functional and affiliated 
departments. The ACWF’s current president Shen Yueyue, already serving as a vice 
chairperson of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress, was 
elected president of the ACWF in 2013. Since Shen’s time in office, she proclaimed that 
“family is a fundamental part of building a harmonious society and a happy life” during 
her “Seeking the Most Beautiful Families”72 campaign launched in 2014, aiming to find 
the local model families to promote a civilized and healthy lifestyle within communities.  
Shen’s “Seeking the Most Beautiful Families” campaign builds upon the aforementioned 
“Harmonious Society” campaign launched by former Chinese president Hu Jintao. Alt-
hough Shen has not directly commented on the shengnü of China, similar to how Hu 
Jintao’s “Harmonious Society” campaign in its later years did not, her “Seeking the Most 
Beautiful Families” campaign solidifies the ACWF’s stance in the “leftover women phe-
nomenon” debate. “Seeking the Most Beautiful Families” campaign emphasizes beauty 
and family, both of which the shengnü allegedly lacks and must “fix” her “problems” in 
order to achieve. Although the ACWF is the leading authority for women’s rights and 
equality, it believes that highly-educated, urban women should change themselves or give 
up something to attract a suitor and get married, thus leading to the harmonious society 
that both Hu and Shen aim to create. In this sense, critics would once again point out that 
the ACWF does not, in fact, have the best interest of Chinese women at its core, even if 
the ACWF is convinced that marriage is the best way for a woman to better herself. In-
                                                 
72 Peter Yin, ed., “Campaign Seeking the ‘Most Beautiful Families’ Nationwide,” Women of China, De-
cember 20, 2014, accessed December 29, 2014, 
http://www.womenofchina.cn/womenofchina/html1/1412/2615-1.htm. 
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stead of promoting women’s wellbeing regardless of her marital status, the ACWF, acting 
as a government mouthpiece, chose to publish articles that ultimately harmed the image 
of thousands of women.  
Analyzing reports and articles published by the ACWF and then reposted or re-
published by other news agencies is crucial in understanding the message and scope of 
the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign. In the ACWF English language archives, 
nearly all of the articles discussing shengnü adhere to same tactic: the outward appear-
ance is positive and encouraging, yet in reality is anti-shengnü rhetoric. In order to pro-
vide a comprehensive analysis of the articles published by the ACWF and to determine 
the overall opinion the ACWF promotes towards the shengnü, a select few of the most 
popular English-language articles will be analyzed.  
On August 31st of 2009, the All China Women’s Federation’s English site pub-
lished an article titled “The Single Urban Woman Conundrum,” which discussed the def-
inition of China’s shengnü and the six different classifications. Prior to this article’s pub-
lication, an article promoting four types of shengnü existed online.  The categorization of 
shengnü by age contains seemingly very few negative remarks about the shengnü. Not 
coincidentally, each category has a title that is a play on the word “sheng” in Chinese that 
could be considered lighthearted and nonthreatening towards shengnü, indicative of the 
early-on neutrality of the term. The categories are:  
The first category is leftover women aged 25 to 27 years, who are called 
“leftover fighters,” sheng dou shi, a play on the title of a popular martial 
arts film. It says these women “still have the courage to fight for a part-
ner.” 
The next category is 28 to 30-year-old women, or “the ones who 
must triumph,” bi sheng ke, a play on the Chinese name for Pizza Hut. It 
says these women have limited opportunities for romance because their 
careers leave them “no time for the hunt.” 
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The final category, 35 and older, is called the “master class of left-
over women.” The term, qi tian da sheng, plays on the name of an ancient 
Chinese legend, the Monkey King. It says this category of woman “has a 
luxury apartment, private car and a company, so why did she become a 
leftover woman?”73 
 
These four categorizations of shengnü based on age are by no means negative compared 
to the six classifications of shengnü. In the “The Single Urban Woman Conundrum” arti-
cle published in 2009. The writer explains that the six types of shengnü are not classified 
by age but rather by unique personality traits responsible for their singlehood. Not sur-
prisingly, each category describes a negative personality trait that the ACWF hopes will 
allow the shengnü to identify with and begin to “fix” their “problem.” From the article: 
Type A -- her specific requirements, as regards a marriage partner's ap-
pearance, personality, talents, academic credentials, economic wherewith-
al, and even place of birth, limit her scope of potential spouses. 
 
Type B is a feminist, and would rather stay single than compromise her 
principles by settling for other than the ideal life partner. 
 
Type C is egocentric and often obsessively house proud. 
 
Type D has failed to make up her mind after having had a higher than av-
erage number of suitors. She believes the best is yet to come. 
 
Type E is disillusioned after a romance that ended unhappily. 
 
Type F is a successful career woman who devotes her energies to work 
and is happy to spend her leisure time with family, friends and colleagues 
rather than a husband. 
 
Each category describes the shengnü in a negative light. Type A is too demanding, type B 
is too enthralled in her ideals, type C is just “too much,” type D is never satisfied, type E 
                                                 
73 Original text from: Zihua Zhi, ed., “Diaocha cheng guoren xuan banlü ai wending nan gongwuyuan nü 
jiaoshi chixiang” (The survey says when choosing a partner, people love men with stable government jobs 
and women with teaching jobs), December 16, 2010, accessed November 9, 2014,  
http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2010-12/16/content_21552148.htm.; Translation provided by: Leta 
Hong Fincher, “China’s ‘Leftover’ Women,” Ms. Blog Magazine, November 22, 2011, accessed November 
9, 2014, http://msmagazine.com/blog/2011/11/22/chinas-leftover-women/. 
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is too sad, and type F is too concerned with “non-essential” relationships. The purpose of 
this type-casting system is to allow both the shengnü and her peers to understand what 
her “flaws” are and why she is unable to find a husband. This strict categorization of 
shengnü implies that a single woman must be one of these six types, and in turn must 
have one of these six things “wrong” with her. Shengnü are plagued by “problems” that 
make them unattractive to suitors, but if she can “fix” herself, then she can find love and 
happiness – it is as easy as selecting type A through type F. 
 Other shengnü articles published by the ACWF are just as troubling. In the 46 
English language shengnü articles published by the ACWF, more than half identify and 
describe the “negative” characteristics of China’s shengnü for viewers to sift through at 
their leisure. Several articles claim to be “helping” the shengnü find love when in reality 
these articles show that happiness will only come when individual goals are lowered and 
desires are cast aside (along with a healthy dose of self-help transformations). In an arti-
cle published in April of 2012 titled “The Startling Plight of China’s Leftover Ladies,” 
the author described a renowned marriage and love expert to whom thousands of young 
single women flock for relationship and dating tips. Her advice? A woman needs to lower 
her standards. The love expert, Wu Di, also coincidentally a contributor to the Chinese 
edition of Cosmopolitan, explains that “it’s unrealistic to expect that you [a Chinese 
woman in attendance] will be madly in love with one person forever, or even that passion 
can be the right guide to marriage.”74 She then encourages women to lower their expecta-
tions. Wu believes that a woman is unable to find a singular man for whom she has deep 
feelings and owns a house and a car, so women need to lower their standards and “bear 
                                                 
74 Christina Larson, “The Startling Plight of China’s Leftover Ladies.”  
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the shortcomings and sufferings of men to be able to get married.”75 Wu’s advice coin-
cides with the “Single Urban Woman Conundrum” article’s point: women must change 
themselves and lower their expectations in order to find (unfulfilling) love.  
 Other articles like “To Be Single or Not? It’s Your Choice,” “Being Picky is a 
Right, Not a Fault,”  “China’s Single Ladies Confess: We’re Happy,” and “Nühanzi76 
Brings a Woman’s World” are also popular and widely circulated on the internet.77 Alt-
hough being single is up to the discretion of the shengnü, as time passes, she should con-
sider that the next suitor might not be better than the previous one. While the shengnü has 
the right to be picky, she should be conscious that her education attainment is considered 
overpowering by men and that she is too outstanding, thus less-tempting to men. There is 
a decision that has to be made for every woman between education and attractiveness – to 
find a suitor, shengnü has to give up something from her life. Additionally, although 
these ladies are confessing to being happy, articles have hinted that this happiness is fake 
and that many women are desperately vying for love and marriage. Lastly, the term 
nühanzi, while describing an independent woman with traditional male work ethic and 
values (both of which could be considered positive attributes in Western countries) is 
seen as a threat to the traditional male gender roles. Such women should learn to be more 
feminine for a healthy relationship. Each of these articles outwardly promotes the 
shengnü, but each offers advice for the shengnü on how to truly be happy.  
For an agency that supposedly supports women’s rights, interests, and economic 
advancement, the ACWF’s statements that unmarried, urban women are single because 
                                                 
75 Ibid.  
76 Nühanzi is a term to describe a woman with a man’s values and work ethic.  
77 All articles are found in the ACWF English language archives.  
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of various character flaws is profoundly absurd. Most articles describe “flawed” character 
traits of shengnü to “enlighten” unmarried female urbanites on how to achieve love. What 
the summation of these articles also implies is that the fiercely independent shengnü 
should not rely on herself to find a suitor or that she is incapable herself of finding love 
and being happy without listening to other’s advice. The shengnü, due to the “leftover 
women phenomenon” campaign, is stripped of her freedom to find love on her own, and 
instead given several how-to guides on “fixing” herself. Because of the ACWF’s articles, 
the public is deeply concerned with this aspect of her personal life (although usually not 
in a compassionate way) and thinks they can solve her “problems” for her – the “prob-
lems” of which were created out of a changing societal structure. 
Unlike the articles published by the ACWF, which as an agency carries more 
authority and therefore produces a message guaranteed to be received by millions, the 
non-ACWF articles about shengnü became popular on the internet because of content. 
Non-ACWF articles are less formal and “fair” in tone that a government agency must 
convey, and this “realness,” while sometimes crude, is what popularizes these articles. In 
a series of shengnü-related internet searches, some of the top results were again flawed 
character or personality traits lists like those published by the ACWF lists that explain a 
shengnü’s singlehood. 
One of the most popular lists describing the so-called “plight” of the shengnü and 
the reasons why she is single is found on Baidu’s online dictionary entry for shengnü. As 
the country’s leading search engine accessed by nearly 70 million users per day, it is not 
hard to imagine that a Chinese person interested in shengnü would start with a Baidu 
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search.78 Once searched, the Baidu page on shengnü contains several sections about the 
woman that viewers can reference in quick links.79 Sections could be entries on their own 
in terms of length, and many have appeared in other news and blog sites, either copied 
verbatim or with the author’s added opinion. One of the most circulated non-ACWF 
articles contains information published from Baidu’s “reasons for being and remaining 
single” section of the shengnü entry. There are eleven unique reasons to why a shengnü is 
single, simplified to her: high standards, feminism, narcissism, perpetual discontent, 
emotional scarring, too career-oriented, an object of ridicule by her peers, lacking interest 
in marriage, codependency, lacking social skills, and disillusionment.80  
These reasons coincide with other lists online that provide reasons for why a 
shengnü is still single. One such list provides interesting answers for a shengnü’s single-
hood, like: overvaluing oneself, persistence in old ways, because of prayer, an aggressive 
personality, pretending that the single life is very exciting, lacking female virtues, inabil-
ity to find fault in oneself, and a lazy or troublesome demeanor.81 Similar articles claim 
that there are as few as four specific reasons why a shengnü cannot find love: she is self-
ish and aloof, she has excessively high standards and is always looking for something 
better, she has an ugly outward appearance, or she is unable to accept the facts about her-
self.82 
                                                 
78 Craig Smith, “By the Numbers: 50+ Amazing Baidu Facts and Statistics,” DMR, last modified April 12, 
2015, accessed April 18, 2015, http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/baidu-stats/.  
79 The definition of, current status of, her specific characteristics broken down into subcategories, type, 
reasons for being and remaining single, the risks surrounding late marriage and late birth, emotional 
obstacles, and the situation in other countries for single women.  
80 Original text and translation can be found in the appendix  
81 Original text provided in appendix  
82 Original text provided in appendix 
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While it is hard to definitively say how many Chinese people have read, re-
posted/reblogged, or heard about them via friends, family, or acquaintances, it is clear 
that because several sites have used or repurposed ACWF and non-ACWF articles, that 
these articles probably have been read by a huge number of people. Searching key words 
or phrases has produced several pages of related, if not the same, material. The “leftover 
women phenomenon” campaign has clearly had some impact on society, as the frequency 
of similar “informative” articles shows. Since this “leftover women phenomenon” cam-
paign relies on participants believing the message, the effectiveness can be interpreted 
from the fact that these articles and lists are forwarded and reposted on blogs and other 
news sites in the first place, with little or no changes made to the “information” that they 
provide. Chinese people believe enough in what the article is saying about the shengnü 
(for these articles validate the reasons and faults for why a shengnü is single) to repost 
and reblog.  
 
Other media, Cartoon Images 
 Cartoons and photographs have played an equally important and influential role in 
analyzing how the Chinese state run media portrays shengnü. In David Nelson’s famous 
sensory semantic theory, he describes how pictures hold two advantages over words: pic-
tures are perpetually more “distinct from one another than are words, thus increasing their 
chance for retrieval and that pictures are believed to assess meaning more directly than 
words.”83 In searches with keywords such as “shengnü” and “still not married, highly-
educated women,” there are reoccurring images. Reoccurring cartoons and photographs 
                                                 
83 McBride and Dosher, “A comparison of conscious and automatic memory processes for picture and word 
stimuli: a process dissociation analysis,” in Consciousness and Cognition 11(2001): 423-460.  
45 
 
were not exclusive to the ‘images’ section of the various search engines, but also found in 
articles and blogs about shengnü.84 Among these images, there are three common image 
types and ‘messages.’ The first type of cartoon portrays a woman on a very high pedestal, 
sometimes using binoculars, sometimes holding a weapon, and always with a crowd of 
men below her. This woman is a shengnü and looking for a suitor more compatible with 
her own high societal status (an equally tall pedestal) – therefore she does not see the 
group of potential suitors below her. The first cartoon’s message signifies the shengnü’s 
nonconformity to traditional marriage norms and inability to find a mate due to high 
standards. In a normal situation, the woman would be found among men or below him, 
but for a shengnü, she is standing above everyone else, signifying her status as both high-
ly successful and ostracized. In the second type of cartoon, there is a woman in a wedding 
dress, but without a groom. She might be wearing a mortar board to signify her high edu-
cation or be holding a sign with some plea for help. This type of shengnü is ready for 
love, but for some reason (usually her educational background, signified by her mortar 
board) is not married. The second cartoon’s message signifies that the shengnü, even if 
her standards are not too high and she is ready to marry someone of a societal standing 
not like her own, is unable to find a husband because of the stigma her educational and 
career achievements carry. Although she abandons her goals and expectations, she is still 
unable to re-conform to society. The third type of cartoon depicts the dating woes of 
shengnü, from both a male and female perspective, and relays the message that although 
the man might have some flaws, the woman is more flawed. The dating woes of the man 
depict a woman as too materialistic or too tied to virtual reality. These three types of car-
                                                 
84 I used Google, Sina Weibo, Baidu, and Tianya 
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toons and the messages they carry are broadcasted to each viewer with bright colors and 
eye-catching illustrations, both of which catch the viewer’s attention and stay in his or 
her memory.  
 Several image searches of shengnü also yield staged photographs of a single 
woman seated across from various types of men. These photographs seem to be part of a 
photo project illustrating the reasons why shengnü are single. The author believes 
shengnü is single due to her unwarranted dissatisfaction with all men. The project is titled 
“You Absolutely Won’t Believe It, 99% of All Leftover Women Are Like This [Blind 
Date],” and has eleven photographs in total.85 Each picture shows the same woman with a 
different man and a caption of why she is refusing the man. The captions of the shengnü 
refusing each man range from his wealth, his age, his occupation, his culture, or his 
size.86 These cartoons and photographs are helpful in understanding what the media’s 
opinion on shengnü is. Some viewers initially believe the images are humorous and do 
not think much past the initial meaning of the captions or cartoon drawings. However, the 
images that viewers see become stored in their memory and regardless of how the viewer 
interacts with them initially, the subtle, anti-shengnü message is subconsciously present. 
These images, like the articles and lists, are widely circulated and can be seen on various 
search engines and media sites. Circulation of specific images implies that people relate 
to and support the message behind each image enough to continue to share. All of the im-
ages in some way or another tell the reader that the shengnü is faulty and unable to marry, 
and the wide circulation of certain images implies that those reposting and reblogging 
                                                 
85 Huishi Jingji, “Ni juedui xiangbudao, 99% de shengnü dou shi zheyang xiangqin de” (You absolutely 
won’t believe it, 99% of all leftover women are like this on a blind date), January 31, 2015, 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_137b8067f0102va3o.html. 
86 Original text in appendix  
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believe in the message of the campaign, just like the people reblogging the shengnü arti-
cles. 
 
Analysis of Images 
Category 1: “On a pedestal looking for love, everyone is below her” 
  
 The following images depict a shengnü standing or sitting atop a very high pedes-
tal, or her “throne” of accomplishments. Standing below her are the potential suitors, 
which are towered by [who cower in the face of?] her achievements. This type of cartoon 
suggests that the shengnü has achieved too much or is too picky/too educated/too proud 
to find a husband on an equal pedestal. All who are left for the shengnü are beneath her. 
Figure 2.1: “Shengnü in a Tower” 
 Source: Womenofchina.cn  
 Figure 2.1 above shows a woman using binoculars to look for her suitor. Howev-
er, she is unaware that her potential suitor is beneath the tower. Her position in the tower 
illustrates the “3 heights” that make her a shengnü and blind her when looking for a 
suitor. If the shengnü were just to look down (aka by lowering her standards for a suitor), 
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she would find a man. But, would these men beneath the shengnü really want her even if 
she did lower her standards? 
Figure 2.2: “Shengnü Throwing Rocks” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Womenofchina.cn 
 
 Figure 2.2 above shows a shengnü throwing rocks over the side of her pedestal. 
Her parents, depicted by the older people standing in front of her tower facing out, smil-
ing proudly behind a blockade. Male onlookers watch as the shengnü throws things over 
the edge, potentially symbolic of her throwing out her “bad qualities” or throwing out 
traditional marriage values. One side of the pedestal says “doctorate” while the other says 
“academic credentials.” 
Figure 2.3: “Shengnü with Her Crown”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baidu  
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Figure 2.3 above shows a shengnü with a somewhat redden and pained expression 
sitting atop her own pedestal, wearing a crown and a sash that indicate she is past the ini-
tial stages of shengnü and has become the Monkey King who has defeated all her suitors. 
The dead bodies surrounding her were potential suitors, yet the shengnü’s ambition and 
quest for personal success slayed them all.   
Figure 2.4: “Shengnü Holding a ‘Marriage Partner Conditions’ Sign” 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Baidu  
Figure 2.4 above shows a somewhat more scantily dressed shengnü sitting atop 
her mortar board holding what seems to be a list of her “marriage partner conditions.” 
She has her back turned to the man and her nose is pointed upwards indicative of dissatis-
faction. The man is depicted as a hardworking businessman ready for love, but the wom-
an still does not want him. This image implies that the shengnü is looking for something 
better than the “ideal” Chinese man, and her rejection of him is therefore symbolic of her 
rejection of traditional marriage values. 
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Figure 2.5: “Shengnü Looking for Love” 
Source: Baidu 
The last image, figure 2.5, is similar to the first, in that the women on top of the 
pedestal are looking for love “in all the wrong places.” The women are using binoculars 
to search for a suitor on a pedestal. Some of the men are standing on the first tier of the 
pedestal marked “highly educated,” but the following two tiers, high career position and 
high salary, remain empty. If only the shengnü were to lower their standards and look 
below their societal status to the men waiting below, they would find a plethora of men to 
choose from.  
 
 
Category 2: “Ready for love, but there’s no one to marry”  
 
 The images in this category were used less frequently in blogs and in articles than 
the first type of cartoon, and most of the images depict a disappointed bride presumed to 
be a shengnü, looking for her husband. 
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Figure 2.6: “Bride with Sign”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Womenofchina.cn 
 
In figure 2.6, the bride is holding a sign that says “This scene is to give public no-
tice of vacancies to be filled, aka the bridegroom’s name.” The groom-less bride is stand-
ing under a spotlight in hopes of attracting attention to herself and showing that she is 
ready for love, her expression hesitant, possibly anxious. But, as a shengnü, there is no 
one coming to love her due to her flaws. Additionally, she does not have a mouth, letting 
the sign do the talking, and possibly indicative of her willingness to become weaker to 
attract a suitor. 
 
Figure 2.7: “Disappointed Bride”  
 
Source: Womenofchina.cn 
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 In figure 2.7 above, the shengnü is standing in a wedding dress looking both dis-
tressed and saddened. It seems as if she is confused at why she is left alone, and even a 
little embarrassed to be all dressed up with no one to be her groom. 
Figure 2.8: “The Bride Going Fishing”  
Source: Womenofchina.cn 
The third image, figure 2.8 above, depicts the shengnü in a wedding gown, but 
she appears to be happier than the other two. She is wearing her mortar board, indicative 
of her high education degree – and dangling a man’s wedding suit from a long, fishing 
pole-like stick. The suit is dangling like bait in front of the Chinese character for ‘double 
happiness” used traditionally at wedding ceremonies. Although she has no one to fill the 
man’s suit, she does not look disconcerted by the absence of a man, and maybe hopeful 
that she will “lure” one in. Compared to the other images, this shengnü seems strong and 
happy with herself. The right man will come along when he is meant to come along for 
this shengnü, but for now she is fishing for a groom. 
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Category 3: “Dating woes of the shengnü, from a male perspective”  
 
 The following four images all in some way depict the dating woes of the shengnü, 
from the male or third party perspective. The first image is from a third party perspective, 
while the following two are from the perspective of a male.  
Figure 2.9: “Man and Woman on First Date” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Womenofchina.cn 
The first image, figure 2.9 above, shows both a man a woman sitting at a table, 
possibly on a first date. Both look flustered and embarrassed while thinking about the 
qualities they are looking for in a partner, and whether or not their date possesses them. 
The woman is thinking about a luxury brand car, a mansion, and a “gaofushuai” or a man 
who is tall, rich, and handsome. The man is thinking about the woman’s age, whether or 
not she is good looking, and whether or not she has a nice figure. This image suggests 
that both men and women are superficial when it comes to love, but that the woman fo-
cuses too much on wealth. 
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Figure 2.10: “Woman and Her Computer” 
Source: Womenofchina.cn 
Figure 2.10 above shows a woman holding her computer tightly by the arm. The 
woman looks happy and content, while the computer looks either frustrated or trium-
phant. It appears as if the computer is frustrated and stressed out at the shengnü’s de-
mands. The symbol indicative of male and masculinity is shooting out of the computer. 
This action could imply that the computer and online dating has become the shengnü’s 
way of finding love, and without the computer, the shengnü would be helpless and feel 
hopeless. From the male’s perspective, this image shows that the shengnü are more inter-
ested in internet love and disillusionment than real life love and marriage. 
Figure 2.11: “Nühanzi Grips the World” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Womenofchina.cn 
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The third, and final reoccurring image depicted in figure 2.11 above, is a personi-
fication of the sign for female and femininity using her strong muscles to crush or contain 
the entire world, potentially seen as a nühanzi, or a man-like woman who is in direct vio-
lation of gender norms. From the perspective of a man, this is how many view the 
shengnü and “leftover women phenomenon.” It seems as if the women are in control of 
the world and being too aggressive in how they handle it. This image is unsettling to men 
and makes men view shengnü as threatening – since the image lacks any traditional femi-
nine values or characteristics. Men view shengnü as a threat to their own masculinity.  
 
Photo project 
 
 In researching images that focus on the shengnü, most were cartoons as seen pre-
viously. However, several similar photographs surfaced, showing a scantily dressed 
woman (by Chinese standards of modesty). Several of the images were published indi-
vidually on blogs or articles, but one site had all of the images posted as a photo project. 
The cartoons of shengnü successfully grab the viewer’s attention through vivid colors and 
simplistic drawings, but the photo project is more successful by using actual human sub-
jects and putting a real face to the shengnü label. By using an attractive woman dressed in 
little clothing, the photographer suggests that this type of woman, the shengnü, is either a 
“tease” or not a “docile, modest” woman that a Chinese man who abides by gender norms 
should want to marry. While the photo project implies that the shengnü believes she is 
too good for all different types of men, an alternative interpretation shows that the wom-
an is the problem – a man could change form to attract her, yet she would remain the 
same for any type of man, unwilling to fix herself or lower her standards. The audience is 
once again redirected to the same argument: a shengnü woman has several personal 
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“problems” that prevent her from seeing what is right in front of her and that she must 
change herself or “fix” her “problems” before she finds someone to marry. A sampling of 
these photographs is below. 
Figure 2.12: “Shengnü and a Chic Suitor” 
Source: “You Absolutely Won’t Believe It, 99% of All Leftover Women Are Like This [Blind Date]” 
The photograph above, figure 2.12, represents the shengnü and her potential suit-
or. In each photograph, the woman and man are shown across from one another at the 
table, as the suitor changes in each shot, the shengnü positions herself in a way repre-
sentative of her reaction to the man. In the above photograph, the accompanying caption 
is “[He is] handsome and chic, but [according to you (the shengnü)] is not a quality man.” 
The shengnü has most of her body facing away from the man, showing her overall 
disapproval and desire to flee, yet her upper body is turned facing the man, her head tilted 
in an inquisitive yet hesitant way, and her right arm extending across the table in a 
somewhat shut-off yet welcoming way. The way the shengnü is depicted reveals her 
materialism - she likes that the man looks and acts hip, yet she is not truly interested in 
him past his sense of style.  
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Figure 2.13: Shengnü and the Working Class Man 
Source: “You Absolutely Won’t Believe It, 99% of All Leftover Women Are Like This [Blind Date]” 
 This second image, figure 2.13 above, is accompanied by the caption “[He is a] 
working class man, but you (the shengnü) again look down on him.” The shengnü’s 
entire body is turned away from this man as she talks on the phone, completely 
disinterested in the construction worker, yet her purse is on the table. The man, who 
appears to be sitting on a stool or on one knee rather than in the chair, is looking at the 
shengnü with interest, and appears to be calling to her. What is interesting about this 
photo is that the shengnü still remains somewhat close to the man that she does not think 
deserves her time. Her purse on the table could symbolize her “obsession” with money 
(as her purse is where her money would be held), and this act could be symbolic of either 
her “I’m too good for you, look at this bag and my money” mantra or her desire for a man 
who will buy her things. The photographer once again provides ample reason for the 
audience to look scornfully upon this shengnü - while construction work is not valued 
highly in Chinese society, this man is representative of the hard working men that help 
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build China and could be a potential suitor. The shengnü is not only rejecting this man, 
but rather rejecting China and its values.  
Figure 2.14: Shengnü and a Young Suitor  
Source: “You Absolutely Won’t Believe It, 99% of All Leftover Women Are Like This [Blind Date]” 
This third photograph, figure 2.14 above, is accompanied by the caption “[He is] 
thoughtful and romantic, however [he is] too naive.” Both the man and the shengnü are 
standing, potentially indicative of a more level economic or social standing (in 
comparison to the construction worker who was kneeling), yet the man is slightly bowing 
and offering a flower to a welcoming, yet annoyed shengnü. This man seems to be 
younger, most likely a college student, and potentially not gainfully employed, inferred 
from his clothing. This photograph is the only one in the series where the man shows real 
respect and admiration for the shengnü – which is in turn misunderstood by the shengnü 
as the man being naive. The shengnü appears to be enjoying the attention, but does not 
seem convinced that this man is a good suitor. Her posture indicates that she, the 
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shengnü, is in fact a tease and has unrealistic expectations. When faced with a man who 
loves her, she still does not like him because of what he cannot offer her in terms of 
wealth or maturity. Love alone is not enough for the shengnü. 
 The role of these articles and images in the portrayal of the shengnü is useful in 
the campaign, yet troubling for the shengnü herself. The state-run media outlets, includ-
ing the ACWF, have promoted negative connotations and images in association with the 
highly-educated, single Chinese woman instead of applauding them for achieving eco-
nomic independence. Non-state run media outlets also provide highly negative visual ev-
idence against the shengnü. The cartoons and photographs were published in order to en-
tice and provoke viewers into believing that the shengnü are flawed or do not possess or 
accept traditional Chinese gender norms. Regardless of how the viewer responds to these 
articles and images, the messages they broadcast (both obvious and inferred) remain in 
his or her mind to be mulled over. Eventually, the viewer (regardless of sex) may begin to 
believe the message and align themselves with the opinions of the state-run and inde-
pendent media. Despite how successful or happy a shengnü is, she begins to think that 
something is wrong with her or that she is not reaching her full happiness by remaining 
single – all of which is suggested through these cartoon and photograph images. 
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CHAPTER 3: WHAT THE ‘LEFTOVERS’ HAVE TO SAY 
 In the 21st century, the use of social media has greatly impacted the world and its 
inhabitants. The transformative power of social media plays a critical role in societal de-
velopment and change throughout the world. In certain regions, social media has even 
aided rebellion and revolution. In China, although censorship impedes and limits mass 
organization and certain discussions, social media continues to play a crucial role in the 
development of both the individual and society. The role of social media in society is a 
popular topic for research and debate, as the specific social media platforms and func-
tions thereof change so frequently that new data is being produced constantly. Social me-
dia is valuable in several ways, by “providing a forum for support and safety information 
during a crisis, an aid for crime-solving, as a form of political influence, as the best-yet 
way to connect across vast distances, and as a revolutionary catalyst in consumer-brand 
engagement.”87  With all other aspects aside, social media exists in its most basic form as 
a tool to state individual beliefs in a way that others can see and comment on in a public 
space.  
 It is not hard to imagine that China, with nearly 1.4 billion people, is the world’s 
largest internet consumer. Of the world’s nearly 3 billion internet users,88 China claimed 
                                                 
87 Samantha Rupert, “Social Media’s Top 5 Contributions to Society,” Social Media Today, April 18, 2013, 
accessed April 2, 2015, http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/social-medias-top-5-contributions-
society. 
88 The site http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ tracks new internet users over time, current es-
timates are near 3.01 billion users. 
61 
 
21.97% of the total with roughly 650 million users in 2014 - nearly 350 million more us-
ers than second place internet user, the United States.89  
 Since the introduction of China’s first microblogging site fanfou.com in 2007, 
more than 30 websites have been operating or introducing information sharing tools simi-
lar to Twit-ter. Preexisting sites like Sina, Sohu, RenRen, and Tencent also introduced 
Twitter-like functionality shortly after fanfou.com, which tremendously aided the popu-
larization of microblogs.90 Since the increase in popularity of microblogs in the past sev-
eral years, internet usage in China has skyrocketed, as more Chinese are attracted to the 
brevity and simplicity of Twitter-like sharing sites to talk with friends, voice their opin-
ions, etc.91 Internet users in China utilize both microblogs and traditional blogs as a plat-
form to express their opinions and connect with other users on common interests and is-
sues. Briefly scanning blogs and Twitter-like posts from Sina Weibo, Sohu, RenRen, and 
Tencent, myriad topics and forums fill up the screen. Ranging from recipes to rants, from 
a photo album of recent travels to an old guitar for sale, internet users are equipped with 
search engine tools to find whatever they desire. Worldwide, social media users range 
from old to young, female to male, across all races and religions, etc. The consumer stud-
ies company Nielsen has compiled several brief summaries of internet usage, social me-
dia usage, etc. and created a brief overview of male and female social media user statis-
tics from nearly 100 countries. Nielsen found that:  
                                                 
89 “Internet Live Stats,” accessed February 16, 2015, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/. 
90 Wang Hongguang, “Microblog: Micropower to a Civil Society” (paper presented at the Proceedings of 
the 8th International Conference on Innovation & Management, Lisbon, Portugal, July 25-27, 2014). 
91 Microblogs are a form of real-time blog that allows users to write a brief text update (usually less than 
140 characters - including spaces) and publish it instantly on the internet through a variety of digital chan-
nels and share them with friends, coworkers, and online contacts.  
Wang Hongguang, “Microblog: Micropower to a Civil Society.”  
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“Both men and women around the world agree that the growth of social 
media as a news source is more positive (78%) than negative (22%). In 
fact, a greater percentage of women (28%) get more than 50 percent of 
their news from social media sources than men (25%)…Women are con-
necting for social reasons more than men. In fact, staying in contact with 
family and friends is the top reason women use social media (65% vs. 
53% for men). More women also use social media than men as a creative 
outlet, particularly for blogging and uploading/sharing photos (28% wom-
en vs. 23% men) and for entertainment purposes (48% women vs. 45% 
men). Comparatively, more men use social media than women for busi-
ness reasons (27% vs. 22% for women), but less than women for “how to, 
information, and self-help” needs (30% men vs. 37% for women). Men are 
also twice as likely as women to use social media for dating (13% vs. 7% 
for women).”92 
 
While the statistics above are an average of information pulled from over 100 countries 
(including China), these statistics could be seen as similar to statistics pooled from China. 
As of June 2014, the total number of Chinese female internet users was more than 280 
million (roughly half of all internet users in the country).93 Chinese female mobile inter-
net users, ranging between the ages of 19 to 35, accounted for 56% of all mobile internet 
users.94 
 Chinese microblogs are referred to as “weibo” or “微博” and translate roughly to 
“microblog” – however, the term weibo also can refer to a traditional blog, as in the case 
of Sina Weibo, where users can access both microblogging and traditional blogging plat-
forms. With the introduction of microblogging in China in 2007, sociologists have been 
tracking the role and influence of social media, specifically microblogging, in Chinese 
society. While numerous reports have been published on the emergence of Chinese mi-
croblogging and its specific characteristics in China, these properties are not entirely 
                                                 
92 “The Female/Male Digital Divide,” The Nielsen Company, accessed March 2, 2015, 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2014/the-female-male-digital-divide.html. 
93 Cecelia, “Chinese Female Internet Users Insight,” China Internet Watch, accessed March 2, 2015, 
http://www.chinainternetwatch.com/10199/female-internet-users-insight/. 
94 “Chinese Female Internet Users Insight.” 
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unique to the microblogging platforms that they describe. Lu and Qiu cite eight features 
of Chinese microblogs: “a platform for opinion, opposition to authority, organization of 
campaigns, development of opinion leaders, participation of government and mass media, 
violence and the rise of internet mobs, rumor and manipulation, and ephemerality.”95 
These eight features of microblogs more or less describe traditional blogging sites, if at a 
lesser degree. Since microblogging differs from traditional blogging in its unique “con-
tent fragmentation96, multichannel integration97, and viral dissemination98,” traditional 
blogs exist more so for the user’s benefit than the viewer’s.99 That is, longer blog posts 
are beneficial for individuals looking to express their opinions with ample reasoning and 
discussion - these blogs are usually more in depth and cohesive than the 140 character 
microblogs.  
 The presence of female internet consumers in the market is profound and suggests 
that women are just as likely as men to discuss and debate topics online. When looking at 
social media users by sex, 43% of total users were female, and 30% of the total users, 
male and female, were between the ages of 26 and 30.100 That is to say that a large por-
tion of internet users and specifically social media users are females that fit the age range 
to qualify as a shengnü. With such a large percentage of internet and social media users 
being women, and then a large portion of those women being in the age range of being a 
                                                 
95 Ephemerality here is describing a scenario where public opinion events on Chinese microblogs usually 
are only closely followed by the public for a period around fifteen days.  
Jia Lu and Yunxi Qiu, “Microblogging and Social Change in China,” in Asian Perspective 37 (2013).  
96 Content it typically smaller in both actual and aggregate file size. Microblogging generally allows 140 
characters in both English and Chinese. 
97 Accessible by a variety of communications devices. Users can post messages through webpages, SMS, 
mobile internet, and instant messaging. 
98 Messages can be transmitted from one point to a vast number of points in a very short time. 
99 Lu and Qiu, “Microblogging and Social Change in China.” 
100 “Social Media in China – Statistics and Trends [Infographic],” Go-Globe, last modified March 12, 2013, 
accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.go-globe.com/blog/social-media-china/. 
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shengnü, it is curious to see so much negativity towards the group of single, highly-
educated women online. Even if the shengnü themselves are only a fraction of total inter-
net and social media users, the chances of their public disapproval of this term and the 
backlash that comes from it should be just as evident online. Do the negative articles and 
images greatly outweigh the blogs and posts by shengnü, or do these retorts exist at all?   
 Chinese media portrays a certain version of shengnü that is starkly contrasted with 
the testimonials and stories of the women behind the label. In response to the internet’s 
remarks about what certain characteristics describe a shengnü and what reasons shengnü 
provide for their singlehood (as mentioned in the previous chapter), I sought to collect a 
series of responses to these labels by these self-proclaimed shengnü to show how these 
women were responding to these harsh, yet widely-accepted criticisms. What I initially 
found was not a plethora of defiant, single women defending themselves against the both 
subtle and outright incessant attacks on her highly educated, highly paid, high-standard 
life, but rather a cesspool for self-loathing and pleas for help. Dozens of netizens proudly 
typed, as they were hidden behind the keys of their message board, “I am a leftover 
woman!” yet the bold declaration often devolved to a mixture of introspection and exis-
tentialism,  as the realization of “leftoverness” triggered an identity crisis. “Without mar-
riage, a husband, or a child, who am I?” these women more or less wrote, either in poem 
or prose.  
 However, between the more depressing posts about being a shengnü, several posts 
began to emerge where the tone of the message was not so bleak. Several posts even went 
so far as to firmly stand behind the shengnü label and explain the reasoning behind why 
the woman wanted to remain single. Not surprisingly, the reasons these shengnü gave 
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were the exact same reasons why the Chinese media said they were unable to get mar-
ried. For example, the media defends that a shengnü is too picky and too materialistic be-
cause she does not want to marry a man who does not already own a car and a house - 
aka financially prepared for a partner. From the shengnü’s perspective, it is not fair to 
herself to marry someone below her economic class. The shengnü has already worked 
hard to accumulate her wealth and capital and would rather build upon her estate with a 
man than end up financially supporting him.  
 In one blog post, user ‘Loveym’ explained that over the years, she was able to es-
tablish good rapport with her shengnü identity. Loveym writes that she was truthful about 
her shengnü title and was not afraid of her age. Even though other people in her situation 
felt that being shengnü was frightening, Loveym said she that she has always been con-
tent in spirit. Loveym explains that as she sees it, she likes her freedom and the character-
istics she has cultivated over the years, and that even though being shengnü does not have 
a good “taste,” that she would rather bear the pressures and stigmatism that comes with 
being leftover than follow a man the rest of her life. Loveym says she still sometimes 
longs for the married life and to have a child, but that she will not choose the wrong man. 
Her thoughts are mature, especially when contrasted with the more depressing blogs by 
other shengnü. In the grand finale, Loveym writes, 
“No matter if I am a shengnü or not, or if I am a “saint,” I do not threaten 
or harm society, more times than not I become the conversation of some 
people. Although I become those people’s conversation for a typical, stub-
born woman, I am living this life of aloofness and freedom. It doesn't mat-
ter if later on I meet the right person or if I am single for the rest of my 
life, I will face all these situations calmly. I clearly know what I want, and 
what I am able and unable to bear… We must love each other with con-
stant love. To those who like to harm the shengnü, please respect your 
66 
 
own character. Whether I am a shengnü or a “saint,” I am still very proud 
to live!”101 
 
Loveym has clearly reached a deeper understanding of herself in terms of her “leftover-
ness,” but her defiance in the face of societal pressure to marry might cause some to be-
lieve that she has either given up on marriage or is confused about what a “happy” life is.  
 Other posts with titles such as “Being a happy shengnü,”102 or “When it is time 
for me to be a shengnü, why can’t I be picky?”103 articles also offer a positive note on 
being a single woman, yet at a fraction of what Loveym has described. Both mention the 
societal pressure and subsequent woes of being a shengnü in a marriage-driven society, 
but both also deviate from the question at hand: what are the shengnü saying in response 
to the media campaign against them? Author* of “When it is time for me to be a shengnü, 
why can’t I be picky?” discusses the pressures both men and women face in society. It is 
only near the top of the post that the author describes that so-called “pickiness” is not the 
shengnü being picky at all. Instead, the shengnü is just making a calculated decision that 
will affect both herself and her parents for the rest of their lives. Pickiness is not a result 
of materialism, as the media would twist it, but rather out of love for oneself and one’s 
family. The author of “Being a happy shengnü” also admits that being “leftover” can lead 
to some problems - but not if you are proactive in your singlehood. The author explains 
that being single is a blessing in disguise - think of how much a married woman has to 
forfeit for her husband, the author writes. As a single woman, the shengnü is free to learn 
                                                 
101 Translation from original text: Loveym, “Wo shi shengnü,” CLM and ALM Blogs and Forum, Novem-
ber 4, 2013, http://blog.chinalovematch.net/forum/post/我是剩女. 
102 Translation from original text: Ban Biantian Xiaoyuan’er, “Zuo yige kuaile de ‘shengnü’,” CNTV Blogs, 
October 28, 2008, http://blog.cntv.cn/7064689-165990.html.  
103 Translation from original text: Fan Yi, “Dang wo shi shengnü shi, wo weihe buneng tiaoti?” Fash-
ion.Sohu.com, January 14, 2015, http://fashion.sohu.com/20150114/n407784448.shtml. 
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yoga, Pilates, how to cook, how to have a tea ceremony, etc. The shengnü woman can 
cultivate her interests if she takes advantage of her situation. These two authors share 
unique takes on what the media has spun into the negative branding of a single lady. 
When the media says “the shengnü is too materialistic and picky and that is why she can-
not find a man,” the shengnü explains that her pickiness is just and rightful and that she 
has worked too hard in life to be careless in choosing a partner suitable for herself and 
family. When the media says that the shengnü is lonely and does not actually live a 
meaningful, content life, the shengnü can show them all the things she has accomplished 
and all of the hobbies and interests she has mastered in her spare time. 
 In answering the question, “why are so many Chinese women becoming 
shengnü?” the media would explain that it is due to the faults of the woman herself, that 
there is something inherently wrong with her thinking or how she is as a person, and that 
is why she cannot find a husband. The author of “Why Foreigners Secretly Like China’s 
Shengnü”104 describes the situation differently; it is not a problem of the shengnü them-
selves that they are not married, but rather because the Chinese men in their lives are the 
ones not fit for marriage. The author explains that Chinese shengnü are confident, mature, 
and independent. All of these things are revered in Western society. In China’s extremely 
patriarchal society, these are not good characteristics for a woman to possess. Western 
men believe that the Chinese men are not appreciating perfectly good “leftovers,” and the 
shengnü are catching on, looking overseas for meaningful and fair love. On the question 
of whom to marry, other blogs offer the alternative that both the Chinese media and gov-
ernment do not want: remaining single. Many shengnü believe that they should not get 
                                                 
104 Qiangguo Huainian, “Jiemi laowai weihe zui xihuan Zhongguo shengnü,” Blog.People.com.cn, May 14, 
2013, http://blog.people.com.cn/article/1368492451962.html.  
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married right away for the sake of getting married and having a child. Many shengnü 
would rather wait a lifetime to find the perfect partner. The media argues that this “per-
fect” partner does not exist, and some shengnü agree. Perfect, to them, is relative, and the 
shengnü admit that some things would have to become a compromise, but that there is no 
negotiation on major items, like financial stability and personality traits. Some women 
are turning towards Westerners for the answer while some women are holding off on 
marriage altogether. Both of these choices make something clear to the reader – the 
blame is not to be placed on the shengnü, as you can see many getting married to foreign-
ers, but rather the blame should be placed on the Chinese men themselves.  
 While the pro-shengnü blogs mentioned above are few in number, do these mes-
sages represent a small stand against the negative media portrayal of shengnü and  possi-
bly as reclamation of the title? According to these blogs, the shengnü debate is not settled 
by the media, showing that the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign is not as effec-
tive as the government would like (since not every Chinese person believes the media’s 
“leftover women phenomenon” campaign). Do these pro-shengnü blogs (and the possibil-
ity of more with more extensive searching) make the case that from the “leftover women 
phenomenon” campaign there is an emerging civil society in China for women and femi-
nist thought?  
 The idea of a civil society commonly refers to a society that is considered as a 
community of citizens linked by common interests and collective activity. From the 
World Health Organization’s website on civil society: 
“Civil society is seen as a social sphere separate from both the state and 
the market. The increasingly accepted understanding of the term civil so-
ciety organizations (CSOs) is that of non-state, not-for-profit, voluntary 
organizations formed by people in that social sphere. This term is used to 
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describe a wide range of organizations, networks, associations, groups and 
movements that are independent from government and that sometimes 
come together to advance their common interests through collective ac-
tion. Traditionally, civil society includes all organizations that occupy the 
'social space' between the family and the state, excluding political parties 
and firms. Some definitions of civil society also include certain business-
es, such as the media, private schools, and for-profit associations, while 
others exclude them.”105  
 
 The presence or absence of a civil society in China is a difficult question to de-
finitively answer. Researchers have postulated a limited social society, where Chinese 
citizens are linked by common interests, but there is little to no collective activity outside 
of the internet and social media. Others have suggested the complete absence of any form 
of civil society, claiming that the Chinese government’s firm opposition to large, non-
governmental action hinders the emergence of a true civil society. Others still claim that 
there exists a presence of a government-sponsored civil society that is disguised as 
somewhat complete [what does somewhat complete mean?] freedom of speech and mo-
bility. Several reports made by Western media outlets such as the Guardian and the 
Economist claim that civil society does exist in China, and is evident by both the growing 
number of state-registered NGOs and the NGOs operating without the consent of the 
state. 
 However, outside of the ACWF, few NGOs withstand the test of time in the in-
creasingly anti-NGO government of Xi Jinping. Despite the ‘state feminist’ label the 
ACWF carries, it is not simply a federation constituting a monolithic block offering 
women no space for freedom of action.106 Advocates for increased women’s rights in 
mainland China are typically an extension of the government-controlled ACWF, yet 
                                                 
105 “Civil Society,” World Health Organization, accessed March 30, 2015, 
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story006/en/. 
106 Wang Zheng, “‘State Feminism’? Gender and Socialist State Formation in Maoist China.”  
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throughout the recent decades, certain women’s rights activists have emerged and re-
mained public in China, regardless of how many failed women’s groups or NGOs sprout-
ed up. While there is almost no information available on women’s groups emerging spe-
cifically from the 2007 “leftover women phenomenon” campaign, other women’s groups 
have tried to form and prominent women’s rights activists have rallied around pressing 
issues like more public utilities for women and domestic violence laws. Whether or not 
these groups advocate specifically for shengnü is yet to be determined, since most famous 
activists take on issues that affect all women, regardless of marital status. One could ar-
gue that the continual attempted formation of women’s rights groups and other NGOs, 
along with protests and demonstrations by activists, suggest that there is an emerging civ-
il society within China, albeit a small force. However, this small force fighting for the 
betterment of women’s rights is continually oppressed by the increasingly anti-NGO, an-
ti-activism government led by Xi Jinping. One day after International Women’s Day 
2015, five of China’s premier women’s rights activists were detained, just days after an 
initial detainment of ten other women’s rights activists. The five women, Li Tingting, 
Wei Tingting, Zheng Churan, Wu Rongrong, and Wang Man, were detained for question-
ing in an attempted protest highlighting sexual harassment on public transportation.107 
The detainment coincides with a larger event that took place around International Wom-
en’s Day, the annual National People’s Congress. While the activists claimed to have 
considered this sensitivity issue, they believe their real crime was in gaining a substantial 
following online in the various microblog services. Following the arrest of leading wom-
                                                 
107 Matt Sheehan, “China Celebrates International Women's Day by Arresting Women's Rights Activists,” 
Huffington Post, March 9, 2015, accessed March 16, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/09/china-arrests-womens-activists_n_6832630.html. 
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en’s rights activists, many have called into question the so-called advancement of wom-
en’s rights and the accompanying civil society.108  
 In an interview with the Association for Women’s Rights in Development group, 
Cai Yiping, Executive Committee member of Develop Alternatives with Women for a 
New Era (DAWN)109, was asked a series of questions about women’s rights and organiz-
ing in China.110 When asked how she would describe the status of women’s rights in 
China at present, Cai stated that gender gaps have widened and that “women still experi-
ence gender discrimination and inequality on a daily basis and throughout their lifecycle, 
from gender-selective abortion, inequality in education, employment and income…”111 
Cai states that in the past people were “inclined to attribute gender inequality to a pro-
tracted and deep-rooted patriarchal culture. However, many activists realize that gender 
inequality and injustice are caused not only by traditional patriarchal culture, but also in-
stitutional discriminatory policies.”112 NGOs are working to resolve some of the issues 
and sources of gender inequality, but Cai points out that wanting to solve a problem and 
actually taking steps to do so are two completely different things. Cai says that “women’s 
NGOs face a legal status barrier and financial constraints. Despite a call for relaxing 
NGO registration policy, registration constriction remains the biggest barrier for NGO 
development in China.”113 Without more relaxed registration policies, NGOs that want to 
become official groups to attract members have a hard time establishing themselves in 
                                                 
108 Matt Sheehan, “China Celebrates International Women's Day by Arresting Women's Rights Activists.” 
109 DAWN is a network of feminist scholars, researchers and activists from the economic South working 
for economic and gender justice and sustainable and democratic development. 
110 “Women’s Rights and Organizing in China,” AWID, August 31, 2008, accessed March 20, 2015, 
http://www.awid.org/News-Analysis/Friday-Files/Women-s-Rights-and-Organizing-in-China.    
111 “Women’s Rights and Organizing in China.”  
112 Ibid.  
113 Ibid.  
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China. Instead of operating within an NGO, many women’s rights activists choose to act 
alone or in small, core groups of activists. However, without the backing of a large, regis-
tered group, these women are easily arrested or detained.  
 Xi Jinping has not only cracked down on women’s rights NGOs and activists, but 
also on NGOs in general, making it harder for groups to volunteer or provide service to 
areas in the country. In 2014, several branches of a rural library chain called “Liren” were 
shut down following increased pressure from local officials, which many have suggested 
were acting under the guidance of leaders closer to Xi Jinping.114 These libraries were 
operated under the volunteers’ collective belief that children should have access to books 
(none of which criticized the government in any way), but were still shut down for am-
biguous reasons. It seems as if Xi Jinping is not only demonstrating his aggressive atti-
tude towards women’s rights, but also to rural education as well. With such a strong grip 
on the lives of his country’s citizenry, one begins to wonder if, despite claims that there 
are, there actually is an emerging civil society, not just one that exemplifies women’s 
livelihood. While in the “leftover women phenomenon” case there are women who 
proudly stand behind the label or reject the idea that shengnü is inherently flawed or a 
societal abnormality, nothing significant has come from the non-media side of the “lefto-
ver women phenomenon” debate. These proud shengnü women are brave and are a won-
derful example of everyday women fighting for women’s rights, but their presence is 
greatly outweighed by that of the media’s. The few pro-shengnü blogs online do not 
make the case for an emerging civil society. There exists no such linkage between these 
                                                 
114 Vanessa Piao, “Rural Library Chain Closes, Citing ‘Tremendous Pressure’,” Sinosphere, September 22, 
2014, accessed March 16, 2015, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/rural-library-chain-closes-
citing-tremendous-pressure/?_r=2. 
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bloggers on the topic, and additionally, the leading women’s rights activists, while work-
ing to further equality for all women, have not had any demonstrations protesting 
shengnü or rallies to link these women on common interests. For now, the women who 
have responded to the shengnü label are a small group against a larger opponent. 
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CONCLUSION 
 What started in 2007 as a way to comprehend a group of women who were not 
following the customary Chinese life, the “leftover women phenomenon” has morphed 
into something larger and more negative than one person or one women’s rights protest 
can solve. Reasons why the state-run media blatantly portrays the shengnü as an abnor-
mality are due to a deeply engrained patriarchal attitude that exists in all facets of Chi-
nese life, and faced with the future problem of millions of unmarried men, the Chinese 
government believed it had no other option to combat this problem then to launch a me-
dia campaign, injecting anxiety into the hearts and minds of urban, middleclass women. 
Articles and images published from 2007 to present have portrayed the shengnü in ex-
tremely negative light, as evident from previous analysis. The campaign has been suc-
cessful in that almost everyone in urban China knows about the plight of the shengnü and 
that multiple sources publish the same material over and over again, meaning that the 
same information is continuously broadcasted. While few women respond to the shengnü 
label on their personal blogs, the media greatly outmaneuvers these women, while the 
government continually censors women’s rights activists. Combined, these two occur-
rences indicate that while a civil society might be forming in response to the “leftover 
women phenomenon,” it is extremely fragile and almost unknown.  
 China faces a huge population problem, and it needs to be solved. However, the 
“leftover women phenomenon” campaign is not effective when considering the gender 
disparity. Shengnü might rush to get married once feeling the societal pressures of single-
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hood, yet there will still be a huge discrepancy between men and women. The way to 
solve population problems is not through a name-smearing campaign that equates women 
with leftover food, but rather through a societal change, where families are proud to bear 
a daughter and women (regardless of marital status) are revered as a strong player in 
maintaining  the peace and harmony of society, if not the strongest player China has. One 
can conclude that the only way this societal transition can occur is if the government rec-
ognizes societal flaws, not the “flaws” of urban women, and find a way to let NGOs and 
civil society form that strengthens the state. Xi Jinping might fear the breakdown of his 
power with the formation of NGOs and a civil society, but it is not my belief that these 
women want to demolish and rebuild the Chinese government. Rather, these women want 
to be recognized for their positive roles in society and what they could bring to the table, 
if they were only allowed. Equating anyone with leftovers and scraps is demeaning and 
detrimental to the future of China – perhaps a shengnü is the one who will possess the 
key to solving one of China’s most pressing issues, but she is disheartened by what socie-
ty thinks of her and instead of pursuing her education or her career, she marries, has a 
child, and forgets about her dream.  
 Some women and the majority of men view typical shengnü qualities negatively, 
where being highly educated may imply arrogance, gainful employment suggests that the 
woman does not adhere to gender roles or respects the man’s place in a family, and 
knowing what she wants may describe a picky and materialistic woman. Conversely, 
many Chinese women and men view shengnü positively, where a highly educated woman 
symbolizes patience and persistence, gainful employment represents industriousness and 
hard work, and knowing what she wants exemplifies integrity and honesty - all of which 
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are traditional Chinese values.115 If only the extremely patriarchal government could see 
that these shengnü are upholding Chinese values, then they would not so aggressively 
target these women as a way to fix society, and instead start to alleviate gender inequality 
and population problems through owning up to previous governments’’ mistakes. These 
women are not “leftover” by any means, but rather the main course that no one is able to 
appreciate during this heightened time of the “leftover women phenomenon” campaign.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Jeffrey Hayes, “Chinese Personality and Character: Confucianism, Asian Values, Communism and Na-
tionalism,” in Facts and Details, last modified December 2012, accessed March 18, 2015, 
http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat4/sub18/item117.html.  
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APPENDICES 
 
List of economic reforms and legislative policies that directly influence women:  
Source: Angeloff, Tania, and Marylène Lieber. “Equality, did you say? Chinese feminism 
after 30 years of reforms.” In China Perspectives 4(December 2012): 17-24. 
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The eleven unique reasons to why a shengnü is single:  
Source: 
http://baike.baidu.com/link?url=X0NGWBaM37PAHuvwna_yWOwxawMfoMtpv2dfqY
RRhrAzCDZyQGd07bCuxj2hXGTdiFaSiwIzhMFGVMLy0qjGscM_h_e1ETgSnaiD4yr
VG. 
 
一、总认为自己很优秀，择偶眼光过高，对男方的长相、才华、学历、人品、经
济、地域等各方面都很挑剔，结果择偶范围狭窄。 
 
1. Always thinking that oneself is superior, the standard for their potential mate is too 
high, [considering] the male’s appearance, talents, education, character, economy, area 
(where they live), etc. [shengnü] are too picky, and the result is a narrow range [of suitors 
to choose from]. (High standards) 
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二、女权主义意识甚强，相处中，男方一旦有与自己观念不同的地方，她们便立即
产生反感情绪。 
 
2. Feminist consciousness [of the shengnü] is very strong, when getting along [with a 
man], once the man disagrees [with the shengnü] on something, this immediately creates 
a bad mood. (Feminist thought) 
 
三、习惯使她们只重视自己的感受，越来越个性化，越来越自我。比如，很多“剩
女”有洁癖，一旦对方在卫生习惯等方面有她看不顺眼的地方，她便无法忍受。 
 
3. [The shengnü] grows accustomed to only placing importance on her own feelings, she 
increasingly is individualistic, she is increasingly narcissistic. For example, a lot of 
shengnü are clean, and once their mate has not pleased the shengnü in terms of cleanli-
ness habits or other areas like that, she is unable to bear [him]. (Narcissism)  
 
 四、猴子掰包谷，最后错过了最佳择偶时期。在当“剩女”之前，她们常常是众多
男子追求的对象，可她总是觉得还会有更好的男士在等着她，最后就被剩下了。 
 
4. The monkey severs the corn, finally she misses the optimum time to find a mate. Be-
fore being a “shengnü,” they often are the pursuit of many men, but she always is think-
ing that there will be an ever better man waiting for her, finally she just becomes leftover. 
(Perpetually dissatisfied)  
 
五、很多人可能会因为一次刻骨铭心的恋爱所伤，从此固执地认为，她此生不会再
有真正的爱了。于是，便有一种自残的心理。 
 
5. A lot of people might because of a one-time bad love experience that is deeply en-
grained in their memories, from this they persistently believe that she (the shengnü) will 
never have a real love. Therefore, they change to have a type of autotomy heart. (Emo-
tionally scarred) 
 
六、事业上要追求成功，不仅仅她自己这样认为，就连她的家人、朋友和同事也如
此鼓励她。加上情感上的伤害和空虚，导致她躲在自己的事业中，以此为寄托。 
 
6. In their career, if they want to want to seek success, she not only herself believes, but 
even her family, friends, and her coworkers encourage her to be successful.  Adding the 
emotions of hurt and emptiness, this will lead to her hiding in her career and for this rea-
son her career becomes her only hope. (Too career-oriented) 
 
七、女权主义思想、自视过高、心灵的伤害等使几乎所有的剩女都有了不同程度的
心理障碍。她们生怕找不到比周围女性朋友的丈夫更优秀的男人，遭人笑话。 
 
7. Feminist thinking, thinking oneself is better than they actually are, heartache, etc. more 
or less describes the varying obstacles in a shengnü’s heart. They fear that they will be 
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unable to find a superior man than those of her surrounding females, so the shengnü be-
comes a joke for other people. (Because of the people around her making fun of her) 
 
八、受晚婚晚育、不婚不育等消极观念的影响，甚至认为其是一种时尚，等意识到
问题后为时已晚。 
 
8. They suffer from the influence of late marriage and late childbirth, not marrying and 
not birthing, etc. negative ideas, even to the extent that they think this is a trend, and by 
the time they realize this is a problem, it is already too late. (Not placing urgency on mar-
riage) 
 
九、不良的家庭教育，迟迟不能“断奶”。有相当部分的剩女只要没结婚，哪怕 30
岁，35岁，40岁，还跟父母住在一起，她们被父母照顾得无微不至，她们在家里
的身份永远是“女儿”，而非一个独立的单身女人。她们在法律上是单身，但是在生
活方式上不是。 
 
9.  There is not good home education, slowly not able to “wean.” There are a considera-
ble amount of shengnü that do not want to get married, even if they are 30, 35, or 40, they 
still are living with their parents, they are treated to the meticulous caring of their parents, 
at home they are always considered the “daughter,” not an independent woman. In terms 
of the law, they are single, but in terms of their lifestyle they are not. (Codependency) 
 
十、苍白保守的生活方式。很多剩女从学生时代开始就是两点一线的生活方式，大
学也是走读每天回家，好像是在上高四高五高六。工作了还是两点一线，只不过把
学校换成了工作单位。朋友就是中学大学的小猫几只，出了校门好像就丧失了交朋
友的能力了。很多中国人的生活都是如此，只有家庭生活+职业生活，完全没有非
常重要的社会生活，没有社交。剩女们都习惯把生活圈子小的原因归结为“因为我
的工作特性，所以没有社交”。 
 
10. [Shengnü] have a somewhat conservative lifestyle. A lot of shengnü, from the time 
they are students, they are torn between two lives. At college, they usually attend school 
during the day and then everyday go home, seemingly as if they are attending high school 
year 4, year 5, or year 6. When they are working, they are still torn between two lives, 
they are only switching out the school for their place of work. Their friends are the same 
from middle school to college, and it seems as if once they leave the gates of their school 
that they lose the ability to make friends. A lot of Chinese people’s lives are like this, 
they only have their home life plus their working life. They completely don't have an im-
portant societal life, also do not have any social skills. Shengnü all have grown accus-
tomed to taking the small reasons in the circle of life and blaming them on “because of 
the features of my work, so I don't have any social interaction.”(No social skills)  
 
十一、把爱情当童话，受挫力差。很多剩女到了 25岁，30岁，还不能从童话公主
梦里醒过来，她们对爱情没有体验经历，只有想象。一旦初恋失败，就痛不欲生，
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然后彻底否定男人，否定婚姻。最雷的一句典型话就是：婚姻是女人的坟墓，我再
也不相信爱情了。 
 
11. They make love out to be a fairytale and they suffer setbacks. A lot of shengnü reach 
25, 30 and are still not able to sober up from the fairytale prince dream, they don’t have a 
lot of experience when it comes to love, they only have their imaginations. Once an early 
love failure, they are unable to bear the pain, then they thoroughly deny men, deny mar-
riage. The most ridiculous typical sentence is: marriage is a woman’s tomb, I again do 
not trust love. (Disillusionment)  
 
 
The eight shortcomings of shengnü and why they are still single: 
Source: http://health.ynet.com/xw/junshi/8716.html 
 
 1、对自己评价过高 (Overestimation of oneself)  
  想结婚却结不了婚的男女，大多对异性持批判性观点，时刻摆出一副高高在上
的样子，动辄就给对方“差评”，无法享受恋爱的甜蜜也在情理之中。剩女惯有的优
势心理作怪，常给人自尊心超强，自我评价过高的不良印象。如果是年轻漂亮、工
作麻利的完美女性自然另当别论，但普通人还是学会客观评价自己比较好。 
  2、我行我素 (Persist in old ways) 
  “工作以外是私人时间，不想被打扰”，“稍不如意，就把周围人折腾得够呛”等
大小姐型的女性让不少男性望而却步。诚然，被当做中心人物的感觉很不错，但是
无法配合别人却犯了大忌讳。必须是能够互相退让、互相扶持的双方才能走进婚姻
的殿堂，我行我素的女性自然就被无情地淘汰了。 
  3、求神拜佛 (Because of praying)  
  很多女性不是不想结婚，而是非常想结婚，但是似乎搞错了努力的方向。佩戴
魔法石手链、祈祷旺桃花、带南美福神 Ekeko娃娃等等，使出了浑身解数还是找
不到男朋友，更别提结婚了。其实，只要有这份执着，与其求神拜佛，不如花点心
思扩大交际圈。 
  4、性格具有攻击性 (Aggressive personality)   
“猛烈攻击别人时似乎有快感”，“也不知道和谁在暗暗较劲，总之浑身充满了
攻击性”，“对已婚朋友赤裸裸的敌意和醋意”，对于这样时刻处于临战状态的女
性，男人可是不敢靠近的哦。甚至女性朋友都不敢给你介绍男人。因此，拒绝攻
击，学会平和是走向婚姻的第一步。 
 
5、装作一个人活得也很精彩   
(They pretend that living the single life is very exciting) 
虽然一直宣称“我不需要男朋友，我没想过结婚”，但是看到朋友恋爱或是结婚
便会脸色大变的女性，在周围人看来，无非是逞强而已，甚至让人可怜。与其这
样，还不如摆正心态，大大方方地表示“想结婚、求介绍”比较靠谱。 
 
  6、缺乏女性美德 (Lack of female virtue) 
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  粗鲁、散漫，连家务活都不会好好做的女性在男性眼中印象分很低。并不是要
求成为“家务能手”，但最起码的煮饭、洗衣、打扫还是要会的，而且穿着打扮也不
能太邋遢。 
  7、永远不从自己身上找原因 (Always looking everyone but oneself for reasons)  
经常有女性抱怨“没人理解自己”，然而，结婚需要的不是一方无条件地理解另
一方，而是相互理解。自以为是，不顾对方感受的女性不从自己身上找原因，而只
会自怨自艾，因此也就遇不到“真命天子”了。 
 
  8、懒散、嫌麻烦 (Lazy, troublesome)  
  有的女性就是嫌麻烦，总是把自己束缚在狭小的空间内孤芳自赏，懒得出去结
交异性。但其实，只有扩大人际交往圈子，才是通往结婚的不二法则。 
  剩女并不可怕，对于“剩女”和“怨妇”只有一墙之隔，她们为了不变成怨妇，虽
然积极的寻找自身的缺点，适时改变自己，并且多和异性交往，多发现他们身上的
优点。但是由于自身眼光过高，始终找不到称心的另一半。只要把你的眼光放低
些，相信很快就会有美好姻缘在等待着你。  
 
 
Photo project, photo titles 
Source:  http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_137b8067f0102va3o.html    
 
你绝对想不到，99%的剩女都是这样相亲的 
有钱没文化的,你看不上 
演艺界的,你没兴趣。 
劳动人民,你又看不起。 
传统男人,不堪束缚。 
小男人面前,你就是女皇。 
父母代为相亲的,没感觉。 
心理变态的,只能做姐妹。 
帅气潇洒的,嫌没素质。 
体贴浪漫的,却太幼稚。 
好不容易碰上对眼的,又是个衣冠禽兽。 
所以,你就自己过一辈子吧 
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